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ABSTRACT 
Cities across the country are experiencing rapid increases in 
gentrification: the influx of middle-class, usually white, residents into cities 
with large minority populations. Reversing a decades-long trend of white 
flight out of urban city schools, a significant number of white middle-class 
gentrifiers are now enrolling their children in urban city public schools. 
Local officials in many gentrifying cities value the renewed interest of middle-
class white residents in urban public schools because it represents an 
opportunity to finally racially integrate urban public schools. It also represents 
an opportunity to keep middle-class gentrifiers, and their tax dollars, from 
fleeing to the suburbs and suburban school districts once they have school-aged 
children. 
In order to attract white middle-class gentrifiers, this Article suggests 
that local officials in some gentrifying cities are implementing certain public 
school reforms for the specific purpose of making their school systems more 
palatable to gentrifiers. Such reforms, the Article argues, harm poor and 
minority students by disproportionally displacing them from their 
neighborhood public schools while simultaneously limiting the number of 
quality public and charter schools available to them. While advocates for poor 
and minority students are mounting legal challenges to the reforms, to date the 
legal challenges have not been successful because courts lack the doctrinal 
support to find that the reforms constitute an actionable form of intentional 
discrimination. 
This Article applies Derek Bell’s Interest Convergence Theory and 
argues for the implementation of legislative solutions that can benefit both poor 
minority students and gentrifiers. Such an approach is a more effective way to 
both capitalize on the renewed interest of white middle-class residents in urban 
public schools and to improve educational opportunities for poor and minority 
students. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For much of the late 20th century, the dominant narrative surrounding 
American urban public schools revolved around middle-class white flight and 
abandonment of public schools. Precipitated in part by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education1 and 
buttressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley,2 middle-
class white students fled urban schools for suburban schools or enrolled in 
private schools in large numbers.3 As a result, most urban schools were left 
with a predominately poor and minority student population.4 Recently however, 
in some urban school districts, the trend of white middle-class flight is slowly 
subsiding. A small but increasing number of white middle-class families are 
enrolling their children in urban public schools.5 This increase is part of a much 
broader trend involving a resurgence of gentrification.6 Indeed, cities across the 
country are gentrifying at a rapid rate as young, middle-class, and usually white 
professionals take up residence in neighborhoods that were occupied by 
predominately poor and minority residents for decades.7 
1  402 U.S. 1 (1971) (allowing for the busing of students across neighborhoods in order to 
desegregate schools). 
2  418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting inter-district desegregation orders, which in light of 
urban/suburban residential segregation, essentially insulated suburban white schools from having 
to integrate). 
3  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public 
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1608 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Milliken encouraged white flight by allowing those who wished to avoid 
racially integrated schools to move to the suburbs without fear that desegregation would reach 
suburban schools); Christine H. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say 
About the Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 80–94 (1983) 
(summarizing various white-flight studies and concluding that school desegregation orders 
accelerated white flight). 
4  See generally Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation 
Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POL’Y INST. 17–18 (2013), http://s2.epi.org/ 
files/2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf. 
5  See, e.g., Linn Posey, Middle- and Upper-Middle-Class Parent Action for Urban Public 
Schools: Promise or Paradox, 114 TCHRS. C. REC. 1, 1–34 (2012) (finding that a growing 
number of young professionals in central city areas want to maintain an urban lifestyle while 
raising a family and that growing economic pressures are compelling a large number of parents 
to opt for public rather than private school); Bill Turque, Henderson Calls White Enrollment 
Growth Good for D.C. Schools, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/education/henderson-calls-white-enrollment-growth-good-for-dc-schools/2011/09/02/gIQA 
kBknxJ_story.html (noting that “white enrollment in the 45,000-student system was approaching 
10 percent—about double the share of a decade ago”). 
6  For a more in-depth discussion of the meaning of gentrification generally and how it is 
used in this Article, see infra Part II. 
7  See Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing 
Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 711, 711–63 (1999) 
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While much scholarly attention is being paid to the ways in which the 
resurgence of gentrification is impacting urban housing markets,8 little attention 
is being paid to the effects of gentrification on urban public schools.9 This is 
likely the case because in past waves of urban gentrification, white middle-
class residents either avoided the public schools or moved out of the city once 
they had school-aged children.10 In the most recent resurgence of urban 
gentrification, however, insulation of public schools from the effects of 
gentrification is no longer the norm.11 Instead, schools which were once 
considered too Black,12 too poor, and too academically deficient to warrant 
(finding that widespread evidence points to a revival of central land markets in urban cities such 
as Chicago, Boston, and New York); Natalie Hopkinson, Opinion, Farewell to Chocolate City, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/farewell-to-
chocolate-city.html. 
8  See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural 
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 
814–815 (1993) (“While gentrification may indeed increase property values and bring higher 
maintenance and investment levels in a neighborhood, gentrification necessarily involves  
displacement of low-income tenants.”); Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: 
Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. 
REV. 739, 768–70 (1993) (describing the effects of certain types of zoning measures as resulting 
in the displacement of low-income residents through the process of gentrification). 
9  A few scholars have analyzed the effects of gentrification on public schools. See, e.g., 
MAIA BLOOMFIELD CUCCHIARA, MARKETING SCHOOLS, MARKETING CITIES: WHO WINS AND WHO
LOSES WHEN SCHOOLS BECOME URBAN AMENITIES (2013) (describing efforts in Philadelphia’s 
gentrifying Center City to market public schools to gentrifiers); JENNIFER BURNS STILLMAN, 
GENTRIFICATION AND SCHOOLS: THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION WHEN WHITES REVERSE FLIGHT 
(2012) (describing efforts by middle-class gentrifiers to reform local public schools); Chase M. 
Billingham & Shelley McDonough Kimelberg, Middle-Class Parents, Urban Schooling, and the 
Shift from Consumption to Production of Urban Space, 28 SOC. F. 85 (2013) (analyzing shifts in 
gentrifiers’ public school consumption patterns in Boston). 
10  See Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, Dealing with Neighborhood Change: A Primer on 
Gentrification and Policy Choices, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CTR. ON URB. & METROPOLITAN
POL’Y 1, 37–38 (2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2001/04/metropolitanpolicy 
(examining in a series of essays the displacement of low-income, usually minority, residents 
caused by gentrification but noting that “poor schools in neighborhoods ripe for gentrification 
rarely pose an obstacle [to gentrification] since many of those who move to [gentrifying] 
neighborhoods . . . do not have children”). 
11  See, e.g., CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 187 (noting increases in the number of white 
children of gentrifiers enrolled in neighborhood public schools in the gentrified Center City 
section of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and anticipating a greater increase due to the changing 
racial demographics in Center City neighborhoods); STILLMAN, supra note 9, at 2 (describing the 
internal conflict that an increasing number of gentrifiers feel in New York City as they grapple 
with finding a way to stay in the city and provide their children with a quality education). 
12  When using the term “Black,” I use the upper-case “B” to reflect the view, articulated by 
other scholars, that Black people are a specific cultural group; therefore, the term “Black” is 
worthy of being capitalized as a proper noun. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, 
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my 
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serious consideration by middle-class whites are now being given a second 
look by middle-class white gentrifiers who wish to remain in the city rather 
than flee to the suburbs or pay costly tuition for private school.13 
Importantly, government economic development and housing policies 
are playing a critical role in facilitating the resurgence of gentrification.14 This 
Article suggests that government policies aimed at facilitating gentrification are 
now extending into the education policy arena as well. To be sure, many local 
governments see the increasing willingness of gentrifiers to enroll their children 
in urban schools as a critical opportunity to retain white middle-class 
residents.15 These local governments view white middle-class residents as a key 
ingredient to uplifting the economic and social trajectory of urban cities that 
often struggle with an anemic tax base and a plethora of social problems.16 
To that end, local officials often view improving urban public schools 
as necessary in order to sustain gentrification because gentrifiers expect the 
amenities in cities to match their middle- and upper-class status and privilege.17 
view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group 
and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1710 n.3 (1993) (“I use the term ‘Black’ throughout the paper for the 
reasons articulated by Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw. I share her view that ‘Blacks, like Asians, 
Latinos, and other “minorities,” constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require 
denotation as a proper noun.’”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (1982) 
(suggesting that the letter “B” in Black should be capitalized because Black is not “merely a 
color of skin pigmentation, but . . . a heritage, an experience, a culture and personal identity”). 
13  See Katherine B. Hankins, The Final Frontier: Charter Schools as New Community 
Institutions of Gentrification, 28 URB. GEOGRAPHY 113, 126 (2007) (“Parent-gentrifiers are 
driving a new demand for urban services that gentrifiers of old largely did not need or 
bypassed.”); Billingham & Kimelberg, supra note 9, at 101 (studying gentrifier parents in Boston 
and finding that many decided to utilize their “financial, social, and human capital” to find 
schools in Boston rather than move to the suburbs or enroll their children in private school). 
14  See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
15  See, e.g., Linn Posey-Maddox, Shelley McDonough Kimelberg & Maia Cucchiara, 
Middle-Class Parents and Urban Public Schools: Current Research and Future Directions, 8 
SOC. COMPASS 466, 466–67 (2014) (“[A]ttracting [middle-class] families to local public schools 
has emerged as a strategy for nurturing the revitalization of some cities.”). 
16  See, e.g., Jonetta Rose Barras, Recruiting Diversity: Michelle Rhee’s Campaign to 
Diversify DCPS Means Wooing White Parents, WASH. CITY PAPER (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/39647/michelle-rhees-campaign-to-diversify-dc-pu 
blic-schools-means-wooing/full (“What used to be white flight is turning into ‘bright flight’ to 
the cities that have become magnets for aspiring young adults who see access to knowledge-
based jobs, public transportation and a new city ambiance as an attraction.”); Kevin Hartnett, 
Middle-Class Parents in the Boston Public Schools, BOS. GLOBE (June 4, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/2013/06/middle_class_pa.html (“For city 
officials, middle-class parents are a seduction and also a policy riddle. They are a boon to the 
schools their kids attend and a great source of tax revenue for the city in general.”). 
17  See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated 
Affluence and the Obligations of Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 23 (2006) (documenting 
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Many urban school systems in gentrifying areas do not match the middle- and 
upper-class privilege and status of gentrifiers because they serve predominately 
poor and minority students.18 They also have a reputation for being low quality. 
In a quest to make their schools attractive for gentrifiers, this Article argues that 
local officials in some gentrifying cities are enacting or expanding pre-existing 
public school reforms in an attempt to increase both the reputational value of 
their school systems and the number of middle-class and non-minority students 
willing to enroll in urban public schools.19 The Article further suggests that 
they are most prominently relying upon two public school reforms: (i) 
replacing so-called failing or underutilized traditional public schools with 
charter schools and (ii) enacting school enrollment policies that favor 
neighborhood schools rather than a system of open enrollment.20 
The net effect of these two reforms has been to further increase racial 
segregation in schools. To be sure, research suggests that closing public schools 
diminishes the number of traditional public schools available to poor and 
minority students.21 Poor and minority students are then required to compete 
for entry into a limited number of quality charter schools.22 Further, the better 
public schools in many urban areas are often located in heavily gentrified 
neighborhoods.23 As a result, by changing enrollment policies to favor 
the ways in which urban cities offer various upscale amenities and services which allow 
gentrifiers to “display [their] status through [their] environment”). 
18  See, e.g., Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the 
Social Construction of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 117, 201 (2002) (finding that 
middle-class parents relied upon information passed through social networks and the number of 
middle-class and white students enrolled in a school in determining whether a school was high 
quality or not). 
19  See, e.g., CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 2 (“Urban areas have experimented with voluntary 
choice programs, magnet schools, charter schools . . . all designed, at least in part, to slow 
suburban flight and increase race and class integration in schools.”). 
20  See Tomeka Davis & Deirdre Oakley, Linking Charter School Emergence to Urban 
Revitalization and Gentrification: A Socio-Spatial Analysis of Three Cities, 35 J. URB. AFF. 81, 
99 (2013) (finding “clear trends in Chicago and Philadelphia, demonstrating an association 
between urban revitalization and charter school emergence”); Pauline Lipman & Nathan Haines, 
From Accountability to Privatization and African American Exclusion: Chicago’s “Renaissance 
2010,” 21 EDUC. POL’Y 471, 488 (2007) (detailing a plan to close failing schools in Chicago and 
noting that “[c]losing schools and then reopening them as new schools is a key aspect of 
signifying to middle-class gentrifiers that the area will be literally reborn”). 
21  See infra Part III.D. 
22  See infra Part III.D. 
23  See, e.g., CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 10–11 (describing the ways in which neighborhood 
schools in gentrified areas in Philadelphia benefit from the resources and active involvement of 
middle-class parents to create high quality neighborhood schools); JACQUELINE EDELBERG &
SUSAN KURLAND, HOW TO WALK TO SCHOOL: A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEIGHBORHOOD RENAISSANCE
(2009) (discussing how parents in a middle-class gentrified neighborhood in Chicago utilized 
their financial and cultural capital to transform a traditional neighborhood school into one of the 
best schools in Chicago). 
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neighborhood enrollment rather than open enrollment, schools are created for 
gentrifiers that serve almost exclusively their children and no others. 
Advocates for poor and minority students wishing to challenge the 
aforementioned exclusionary effects of public school reforms in gentrifying 
areas have, to date, relied upon court actions in which they allege that the 
reforms constitute unlawful discrimination.24 Some groups are also bringing 
administrative complaints with the United States Department of Education, 
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) alleging violations of Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act (“Title VI”).25 
The primary argument made by this Article is that neither the courts 
nor OCR have the necessary doctrinal support in the case law related to 
intentional discrimination to properly address the harms caused to poor and 
minority students by the reforms. Thus, instead of using the court system to 
prevent the harms to poor and minority students as a result of the market-based 
reforms, this Article takes the position that legislative solutions that benefit 
both poor and minority students and gentrifiers should be explored. A 
legislative approach, rather than a litigation approach, is a more effective way 
of capitalizing on the renewed interest of white middle-class gentrifiers in 
enrolling their children in urban public schools.  
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly describes the resurgence 
of gentrification in urban areas. It examines the various waves of gentrification 
in the United States and assesses the ways in which government economic 
development and housing policies contribute to the resurgence of gentrification 
in the United States. It then discusses the benefits and costs of gentrification. 
Part III examines the impact of the resurgence of gentrification on urban public 
schools. It specifically focuses on three cities: Chicago; Philadelphia; and 
Washington, D.C. It analyzes the ways in which public school reforms are 
being used in these cities as a means of enticing predominantly white middle- 
and upper-class gentrifiers to remain in the city. It also analyzes how such a 
strategy harms poor and minority students. 
24  See Smith v. Henderson, No. 13-420 (JEB), 2014 WL 3555310 (D.D.C. July 18, 2014) 
(challenging the closure of neighborhood schools in predominately Black areas as racially 
discriminatory); Swan v. Bd. of Educ., No. 13-C-3623, 2013 WL 4401439 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 
2013) (challenging the closure of several Chicago public schools in predominately Black and 
Latino neighborhoods as racially discriminatory); V.L. v. Sch. Dist. of Phil., No. 2:12-cv-03182 
(E.D. Pa. filed June 5, 2012) (challenging the closure of North Philadelphia neighborhood 
schools as having a disparate impact on poor and disabled students). 
25  See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Are School Closings the “New Jim Crow?” Activists File Civil 
Rights Complaints, WASH. POST (May 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/educat 
ion/2014/05/13/1a0d3ae8-dab9-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html (“Arguing that school 
closures in cities across the country disproportionately affect African American students, 
community activists filed three federal civil rights complaints . . . challenging closures in 
Newark, New Orleans and Chicago . . . .”). 
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Part IV discusses the various legal challenges that advocates for poor 
and minority students are making to public school closings and the expansion 
of charter schools in gentrifying areas. It then analyzes the refusal of courts to 
conceptualize the harms suffered by poor minority students because of the 
public school reforms as an actionable discrimination. 
Part V examines the ways in which the public school reforms currently 
being enacted in gentrifying areas create an interest divergence between poor 
minority students and gentrifiers. It applies Derek Bell’s Interest Convergence 
Theory, identifies ways in which the interests of poor and minority families 
converge with white middle-class gentrifiers, and argues that application of this 
theory to legislative reforms of gentrification may allow for a political solution 
that satisfies both parties’ interests. It then proposes legislative solutions that 
could meet the needs of both poor and minority students and gentrifiers. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. THE RESURGENCE OF GENTRIFICATION
Various meanings and political connotations are ascribed to the term 
gentrification.26 Some scholars use the term to describe the process by which 
housing stock and infrastructure in an urban neighborhood are upgraded and 
low-income residents are displaced by middle- and upper-class residents.27 
Indeed, the term gentrification was first used by English writer Ruth Glass to 
describe the process of middle-class residents moving into working class 
neighborhoods in London, upgrading the housing stock, and eventually 
displacing the working-class residents.
28
 Other scholars use the term 
gentrification to encapsulate a much broader process of intentional 
disinvestment in an urban neighborhood followed by a period of reinvestment 
which causes both a class- and race-based transformation of the 
neighborhood.29 Lastly, some scholars eschew the notion that gentrification is 
26  For a comprehensive discussion of the historical definitions given to gentrification, see J. 
JOHN PALEN & BRUCE LONDON, GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD 
REVITALIZATION 6–10 (1984). 
27  See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 5 (defining gentrification as the 
involuntary displacement of residents by higher income residents and the physical upgrading of 
the neighborhood and change in the neighborhood’s character). 
28  See Ruth Glass, Aspects of Change, in THE GENTRIFICATION DEBATES 18, 18–27 (Japonica 
Brown-Saracino ed., 2010). 
29  See, e.g., NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST
CITY 37 (1996) (“Gentrification is no longer about a narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing 
market but has become the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavor: the class remake 
of the central urban landscape.”); Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and 
Displacement: Connections, Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195, 198–99 (1985) (defining gentrification as “new residents—who are 
disproportionately white, professional, technical, and managerial workers with higher education 
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synonymous with displacement and instead use the term to mean an overall 
revitalization or improvement of commercial and residential areas in urban 
neighborhoods.30 
While the definitions and political connotations attached to the term 
gentrification vary, three common components emerge: (i) an influx of capital; 
(ii) displacement—or at a minimum a change in the class of people who occupy 
a neighborhood; and (iii) transformation of the community within the 
neighborhood. Given the common modules that emerge from the different 
definitions of gentrification used by scholars, this Article uses the term 
gentrification to mean an influx of capital into a community that once suffered 
from a disinvestment of capital, which results in the movement of people, 
particularly higher-income people, into a community. Applying this definition 
of gentrification, urban cities across America are experiencing staggering 
increases in gentrification.31 Scholars are labeling this uptick in gentrification 
as a resurgence of gentrification.32 
This current resurgence of gentrification is being further fueled by the 
enactment of local public school reforms. To better understand the ways in 
which these reforms are being used, it is important to understand the contours 
of modern day gentrification, particularly the ways in which it is different from 
past rounds of gentrification. To that end, this section provides a brief 
description of the various waves of gentrification in the United States. It then 
examines the most recent resurgence of gentrification, paying particular 
attention to the role that government economic development and housing 
policies are playing in facilitating the resurgence of gentrification. It concludes 
by discussing the benefits and downsides to the most recent resurgence of 
gentrification. 
and income levels—replac[ing] older residents—who are disproportionately low-income, 
working-class and poor, minority and ethnic group members, and elderly from older and 
previously dilapidated inner-city housing in a spatially concentrated manner that is to a degree 
differing substantially from the general level of change in the community or region as a whole”); 
john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and 
the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433 (2003) (describing the 
ways in which gentrification is rooted in race and class transformation of urban areas). 
30  See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 406 (2003) 
(noting that the negative connotations attached to gentrification are misguided, particularly the 
idea that gentrification displaces poor minorities, and instead defining gentrification as “the 
process by which people of higher incomes move into lower income urban areas and seek to 
change its physical and social fabric to better meet their needs and preferences”). 
31  See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 7, at 713 (arguing that “[g]entrification . . . witnessed a 
resurgence in the 1990s that . . . quickly erased any lingering suspicion that the process was only 
a brief historical aberration”). 
32  See id. at 713–15. 
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A. Waves of Gentrification 
The causes and consequences of gentrification are subject to much 
debate.33 A complete account of the various theories regarding gentrification is 
beyond the scope of this Article and has been written about extensively by 
other authors.34 Nevertheless, the scholarly literature on gentrification generally 
recognizes three different time periods or waves in which gentrification 
occurred in American urban cities.35 Some scholars also suggest that the 
gentrification that is currently occurring is part of an evolving fourth wave of 
gentrification.36 
The first wave of gentrification occurred from the 1950s through the 
mid-1970s.37 It involved the infusion of public subsidies, particularly tax 
incentives, into urban areas in order to induce investment and relocation into 
inner-cities by businesses and affluent individuals.38 This was done in an 
attempt to counter the mass outmigration of white residents from urban inner-
cities to the suburbs during the same time frame.39 Gentrification during this 
time period generally occurred in a sporadic rather than deliberate manner.40 In 
the United States, gentrification during this time period was also localized 
insofar as it was limited to larger urban inner-cities primarily in the 
northeastern part of the country.41 
33  See, e.g., Japonica Brown-Saracino, Overview: The Gentrification Debates, in THE 
GENTRIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 28, at 1, 14. 
34  See, e.g., id.; TIM BUTLER, GENTRIFICATION AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES 35–54 (1997); 
SMITH, supra note 29, at 38–42. 
35  See generally Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Gentrification, Housing Policy and the 
New Context of Urban Redevelopment, in 6 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
211, 217–19 (Kevin Fox Gotham ed., 2001) (describing three waves of gentrification with “each 
wave ‘tied to a particular constellation of political and economic conditions nested at larger 
geographic scales’”); Jason Hackworth & Neil Smith, The Changing State of Gentrification, 92 J.
ECON. & SOC. GEOGRAPHY 464, 465–68 (2001). 
36  See LORETTA LEES, TOM SLATER & ELVIN WYLY, GENTRIFICATION 179 (2008) (“Several 
developments in the first half of this decade . . . suggest that we are seeing a new, distinctive 
fourth wave of gentrification . . . .”). 
37  See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 466. 
38  See id. 
39  See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 217. 
40  See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 466 (noting that the first wave of gentrification 
during the 1950s though 1970s was sporadic and state-led as local and national governments 
sought to counteract the economic decline of inner-city neighborhoods); Christopher Niedt, 
Gentrification and the Grassroots: Popular Support in the Revanchist Suburb, 28 J. URB. AFF. 99, 
100 (2006). 
41  See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 467. 
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The second wave of gentrification occurred in the post-recession 1970s 
through the late 1980s.42 Generally speaking, during the second wave, the state 
took a laissez-faire approach towards gentrification.43 It only intervened in the 
form of public-private partnerships once investment by private actors proved 
that gentrification was viable in a particular area.44 Significantly, gentrification 
during this time period became integrated into a much larger global and 
national scale process.45 Put another way, whereas gentrification during the first 
wave occurred on a localized level in certain areas such as the northeast United 
States, gentrification during the second wave became a global phenomenon.46 
Importantly, during this wave of gentrification, long-time residents and 
activists often mounted aggressive challenges to gentrification because 
gentrification was commonly linked to the displacement of minorities and the 
poor.47 
The third wave of gentrification occurred during the post-recession 
1990s.48 This third wave—or resurgence of gentrification—is arguably ongoing 
today,49 though some scholars suggest that this third stage is morphing into an 
even more complex fourth wave of gentrification.50 For purposes of this 
Article, the third and fourth waves of gentrification are discussed together as 
the “resurgence of gentrification.” 
The resurgence of gentrification differs from prior waves of 
gentrification in significant ways. First, the bounds of gentrification are now 
expanding beyond just the inner-city and into more remote locations such as 
42  See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 217. 
43  See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 466. 
44  See id. (noting that most local state efforts related to gentrification “focused on prodding 
the private market rather than directly orchestrating gentrification”). 
45  See id. at 468; Niedt, supra note 40, at 100. 
46  See SMITH, supra note 29, at 36–37 (suggesting that gentrification by the 1970s became 
part of a global urban restructuring as cities found themselves competing in the global market). 
47  See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 468. 
48  See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 218. 
49  See powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 459–65 (detailing the different stages of 
gentrification occurring in Detroit, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago); Wyly & Hammel, 
supra note 7, at 761 (concluding that gentrification in Chicago, Boston, Seattle, Washington 
D.C., Detroit, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia showed clear evidence of gentrification in the 1990s 
and noting that “[b]etween 1992 and 1997 gentrified neighborhoods in those cities attracted 
mortgage investment[s] that grew more than 2.3 times as fast as the suburban rate”); Timothy 
Williams, Cities Mobilize to Help Those Threatened by Gentrification, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/us/cities-helping-residents-resist-the-new-gentry.htm 
l?_r=0 (noting that the latest wave of gentrification happened very quickly and citing Boston, 
Seattle, New York, Washington D.C., and Atlanta amongst the fastest gentrifying cities). 
50  See, e.g., LEES, SLATER & WYLY, supra note 36, at 173–86 (arguing that a new fourth 
wave of gentrification emerged after the 2001 recession which is being fueled by changes to 
housing finance policies, resulting in increased capital investment in inner-cities). 
688 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118 
inner-ring suburbs.51 Similar to the gentrification expansion that occurred 
during the second wave, the boundary expansions of gentrification are also part 
and parcel of globalization.52 
Second, corporate developers and financial institutions are much more 
involved and visible during this recent resurgence of gentrification. Corporate 
developers are increasingly spearheading current gentrification efforts, whereas 
in past waves of gentrification, corporate developers and financial institutions 
only got involved once a neighborhood had already begun the process of 
gentrifying.53 Further, some scholars suggest that while financial institutions 
were previously risk averse, reluctant to make loans to borrowers in gentrifying 
areas, financial institutions during the resurgence of gentrification are much 
more aggressive in making loans, particularly to wealthy individuals or 
corporations seeking to enter a gentrifying urban area.54 
Third, there is less resistance to gentrification from policymakers and 
grassroots advocates this time. Gentrification is now theorized as uplifting the 
economic and political plight of poor individuals who are purportedly doomed 
to live in neglected and disinvested neighborhoods without the entry of more 
affluent individuals and corporations.55 Thus, while gentrification was once 
thought to be a dirty word synonymous with displacement and marginalization 
of the poor and minorities,56 it is now more readily embraced as a solution to 
the capital and cultural disinvestment that has long plagued urban areas.57 
Lastly, a key factor that differentiates the most recent resurgence of 
gentrification from other waves of gentrification is that the resurgence of 
gentrification coincides with a cultural shift and economic shift that is drawing 
more educated and affluent people to urban cities. With respect to the cultural 
shift, living in urban inner-cities was once considered a last resort for 
minorities, the poor, and others who lacked viable housing choices.58 
51  See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 468. 
52  See id. 
53  Id.; Loretta Lees, Super-Gentrification: The Case of Brooklyn Heights, New York City, 
400 URB. STUD. 2487, 2496 (2003) (describing the gentrifying effect of corporate development in 
downtown Brooklyn). 
54  See LEES, SLATER & WYLY, supra note 36, at 181 (arguing that “[i]n contrast to earlier 
waves [of gentrification] when financial institutions were risk averse . . . lenders are now 
aggressively competing to make loans”). 
55  See Byrne, supra note 30, at 406; Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 468. 
56  See Byrne, supra note 30, at 405. 
57  See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and 
Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 551 (2007) (arguing that 
“[r]esiding in a gentrifying neighborhood also should ameliorate the social isolation entailed by 
economic housing segregation, which some have seen as an important factor in the perpetuation 
of poverty”). 
58  See McFarlane, supra note 17, at 11. 
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Particularly for the white middle-class, the ideal vision of success and 
achievement was the ability to live in a suburb with a spacious home, minimal 
crime, and plenty of space for children and pets to roam.59 Urban cities were 
painted as the antithesis of this ideal.60 This is no longer the case. Middle-class 
residents, particularly young professionals, are now more likely to be drawn to 
urban cities and resist moving to the suburbs.61 
Scholars also suggest that the cultural shift that is drawing middle-class 
and affluent young professionals to urban cities is intertwined with an 
economic shift away from manufacturing and towards service industries.62 
They further suggest that “[g]lobalization’s re-ordering of economies away 
from manufacturing and towards service industries has dualized the economy 
into groups of those with high salaries and those without.”63 The group of 
people with high incomes—often called the “creative class”—are typically 
knowledge-based professionals such as scientists, engineers, artists, lawyers, or 
anyone who makes a living based upon their creative thought process.64 They 
value space that allows them to have face-to-face interactions to meet both their 
professional and personal needs.65 Urban cities and not the suburbs are 
intentionally positioning themselves to fill the demands of this creative class. 
As discussed in the section that follows, local, state, and federal government 
policies, economic development, and housing policies are often put in place 
specifically to draw the creative class to urban cities, thereby facilitating 
gentrification. 
B. Recruiting Middle-Class Residents: The Public Policy Dimensions of 
the Resurgence of Gentrification 
During the mid-20th century, urban cities were decimated by the 
decline in the manufacturing economy and the rise of the knowledge-based 
59  See id. at 12–13. 
60  See id. at 13. 
61  See, e.g., Joseph Berger, Suburbs Try to Prevent an Exodus as Young Adults Move to 
Cities and Stay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/nyregion/sub 
urbs-try-to-hold-onto-young-adults-as-exodus-to-cities-appears-to-grow.html (summarizing the 
results of a study finding that “younger adults are becoming more drawn to denser, more compact 
urban environments that offer a number of amenities within walking distance of where they live,” 
and suggesting that younger professionals are now inclined to stay in the city rather than move to 
a suburb). 
62  See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED (2012). 
63  McFarlane, supra note 17, at 13. 
64  Id. at 13–14. 
65  See FLORIDA, supra note 62, at 188–89 (suggesting that place is critical for the creative 
class and that they prefer cities because cities are “enabling infrastructure where connections take 
place, networks are built, and innovative combinations are consummated”). 
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economy.66 The decline in the manufacturing economy significantly reduced 
the tax base for many urban cities because as manufacturing plants closed 
down, cities lacked other viable options for generating tax revenue.67 Urban 
cities also saw a substantial number of their middle-class residents depart for 
the suburbs.68 
Importantly, racially circumscribed government policies encouraged 
and aided the mass migration of white middle-class residents from the cities to 
the suburbs while keeping minority residents confined to the inner-cities.69 For 
example, federal government mortgage insurance underwriting programs would 
only underwrite loans for home purchases in racially homogenous white 
communities and explicitly encouraged the maintenance of residential 
segregation as a matter of public policy.70 Such a policy raised substantial 
barriers for Blacks wishing to migrate to the suburbs.71 At the same time, 
government policies paved the way for white residents to move to the suburbs. 
Federal subsidization of home mortgages for whites only, along with the 
federal government providing states with federal funds to build highways, 
made it easy for white middle-class citizens to live in suburban outposts and to 
commute to central cities for work.72 As a result of these policies, by the mid-
20th century, middle-class white flight from the cities to the suburbs reached its 
peak.73 In turn, many American urban cities found themselves in fiscal distress 
due to a limited tax base from which to draw.74 In addition, the residents who 
remained in the city were overwhelmingly poor and minority.75 
Because of the loss of actual and human capital caused by the decline 
of manufacturing and white flight, many urban inner-cities have been on a 
quest to attract more middle-class and affluent residents in hopes of shoring up 
their tax bases. Indeed, since the 1960s, local government policies in most 
66  See supra Part II.A. 
67  See FLORIDA, supra note 62, at 314 (describing the inability of cities such as Detroit, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh to adjust away from the norms of the previous manufacturing economy 
and the declines that occurred in those cities as a result); McFarlane, supra note 17, at 9 (“The 
loss of middle and upper-income households affected central cities negatively by decreasing the 
demand for urban land, reducing land values, and diminishing central cities’ tax bases.”). 
68  See generally WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD
WAR II, at 112–13 (2007); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993). 
69  See generally sources cited supra note 68. 
70  See Erika K. Wilson, Towards a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public 
Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1428–29 (2014). 
71  Id. at 1428–30 (describing the role of federal, state, and local policies in contributing to 
residential racial segregation in the suburbs and urban areas). 
72  Id. at 1428. 
73  Id. at 1428–30. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
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urban localities have reflected James Buchanan’s Recruitment Theory.76 
Buchanan theorized that in order to not only survive but thrive, urban cities 
must enact policies aimed at attracting and retaining more affluent taxpayer 
residents.77 
More specifically, Buchanan suggested that urban cities must enact 
fiscal policies and add amenities to induce “potentially-mobile central-city 
taxpayers who contribute to the net fiscal surplus” of a city.78 He also 
recommended providing amenities like museums, symphony orchestras, and 
theaters that middle-class and affluent residents would find attractive but 
unlikely to obtain without great cost in the suburbs.79 While Buchanan 
acknowledged that such a deliberate policy strategy aimed at recruiting middle-
class and affluent residents had the potential to exclude poor and minority 
residents, he also reasoned that such policies “by preserving the fiscal base of 
the community, may benefit the very groups that seem initially to be harmed.”80 
Put another way, he theorized that the benefits that accrue from having 
residents who can contribute to a city’s tax base would trickle down to poor and 
minority residents. Similar arguments have been made by other scholars in 
defense of urban localities adopting a middle-class recruitment strategy.81 
Buchanan’s theory regarding affluent resident attraction is being put 
into practice heavily during the resurgence of gentrification. Federal, state, and 
local policies are being enacted explicitly to attract middle-class and more 
affluent residents to cities.82 The two primary ways in which government 
policies are being utilized to aid in the resurgence of urban gentrification are 
through policies aimed at spurring economic development and through housing 
placement and finance policies.
83
 The roles that these policies are playing in 
facilitating the resurgence of gentrification are discussed in turn. 
76  See James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1, 13–16 
(1971). 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 1. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  See generally Douglas W. Rae, Two Cheers for Very Unequal Incomes, in JUSTICE AND
THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS 105, 106 (Clarissa Rile Hayward & Todd Swanstrom eds., 2011) 
(suggesting that “those . . . who want better life chances for low-earning households in major 
cities should set out to increase inequality by attracting and keeping high [income] earners, now 
greatly underrepresented in central city populations”). 
82  See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 12 (noting that “[m]any cities pursue 
revitalization policies with the expressed intention of providing incentives for middle- and high-
income families to move into distressed communities, or inducements for original residents to 
upgrade their homes”). 
83  See generally powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 454 (“While the restructuring of the 
national system of housing finance opens up home mortgages to low- and moderate-income 
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1. Policies Aimed at Spurring Economic Development
At the state and local level, economic development policies are being 
enacted with the deliberate goal of luring middle-class and affluent individuals 
and businesses to urban inner-cities. One of the most prominent policy tools 
being used to attract residents are tax incentives that take the form of tax credits 
or abatements.84 For example, in Philadelphia, residents who choose to reside 
in new urban construction or renovated buildings are given a 10-year tax 
abatement.85 The tax abatement program “holds the tax assessment at a 
property’s predevelopment level for 10 years.”86 Arguably as a result of the tax 
abatement program, Philadelphia, which was previously in the midst of a 40-
year decline in population, saw its population increase significantly.87 
Favorable tax policies enacted in gentrifying cities such as San Francisco and 
Atlanta are also arguably causing significant increases in gentrification in those 
cities.88 
In addition to tax incentives, state and local governments are utilizing 
their police power as an economic development tool to facilitate gentrification. 
They do so through strategic enforcement of housing codes.89 Targeted 
households, it also has ‘unleased powerful gentrification forces.’”); Wyly & Hammel, supra note 
7, at 720–23. 
84  See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 12–13 (describing the various tax 
abatements and incentives that are given by state and local governments to spur home and condo 
purchases in urban areas); Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High 
Price, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayers-
bankroll-corporations.html?pagewanted=all (noting that “states, counties and cities are giving up 
more than $80 billion each year to companies” in an effort to induce companies to remain in or 
relocate to urban cities in an effort to create jobs for residents). 
85  See Lisa Chamberlain, Tax Breaks Drive a Philadelphia Boom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/realestate/08nati.html?pagewanted=all (describing the 
impact of the tax abatement program on revitalizing the Center City area of Philadelphia and 
noting that “from the time that tax abatements were passed, more than 8,000 converted and new 
units will have been added to Center City, and half of all new residents benefiting from tax 
abatements came from outside the city”); Tax Abatement, OFF. OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV., 
http://www.phila.gov/ohcd/taxabate.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
86  Chamberlain, supra note 85. 
87  Id. 
88  See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 12–13 (“In San Francisco, the favorable 
tax treatment of live/work lofts, totaling in the tens of millions of dollars is believed to have been 
an important factor in the development of large numbers of . . . upper income units in the South 
of Market area.”). 
89  See, e.g., DIANE K. LEVY, JENNIFER COMEY & SANDRA PADILLA, KEEPING THE
NEIGHBORHOOD AFFORDABLE: A HANDBOOK OF HOUSING STRATEGIES FOR GENTRIFYING AREAS  
13 (2006), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/keeping-neighborhood-affordable 
(discussing the ways in which housing code enforcement can be used to preserve affordable 
housing or displace residents and noting that “[i]n gentrifying areas, an agency might over-
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enforcement (or lack thereof) of housing codes can make a neighborhood more 
(or less) attractive to the type of development that spurs gentrification.90 State 
and local governments also use other policy tools to further gentrification, such 
as constructing new sports stadiums, museums, restaurants, and shopping 
centers that cater to the interests of the middle-class and the affluent in an 
attempt to draw them to the city.91 
2. Housing Policies
At the federal level, changes to national housing policies are playing a 
substantial role in the recent resurgence of gentrification. Most notably, in an 
effort to increase homeownership, the federal government put policies in place 
to expand the secondary mortgage market.92 In particular, in 1992 Congress 
passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act 
(“FHEFSSA”) which required Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) to 
increase their acquisition of residential loans to low-income and minority 
borrowers.93 The FHEFSSA also established affordable housing goals which 
required GSEs to promote home ownership for low- and moderate-income 
families and for any borrower in an “underserved area,” regardless of their 
income level.94 The term “underserved area” was defined in such a way that it 
captured a large number of urban neighborhoods. Case in point, the definition 
section of the FHEFSSA includes language that allows the term “underserved 
area” to mean an area with an African-American and Hispanic population of at 
least 30%.95 Some scholars suggest that the “underserved area” definition, 
enforce to further neighborhood revitalization and increase displacement pressures on lower-
income households”). 
90  See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 14 (“In San Francisco, observers argue 
that lax code enforcement has encouraged the construction of thousands of upper-income 
live/work lofts in gentrifying neighborhoods.”). 
91  See id. (“In Washington, D.C., the two hottest gentrifying areas surround a newly opened 
subway station (Columbia Heights) and a new convention center (Shaw).”); McFarlane, supra 
note 17, at 16 (describing how consumption policy strategies such as “[t]ailor[ing] land use and 
development to meet the consumption tastes of people with money to spend by building 
entertainment venues, convention centers, festival marketplaces, ethnic and historical festivals, 
sports stadiums, hotels, restaurants, shopping, and bars (both coffee and alcohol)” facilitate 
gentrification). 
92  See powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 449–50. 
93  12 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4642 (2014); see also Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 247 
(describing the impact of the FHEFSSA on urban gentrification). 
94  12 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(1) (“To increase the liquidity of mortgage investments and improve 
the distribution of investment capital available for mortgage financing for underserved markets, 
each enterprise shall provide leadership to the market in developing loan products and flexible 
underwriting guidelines to facilitate a secondary market for mortgages . . . .”). 
95  See Stuart A. Gabriel & Stuart S. Rosenthal, The Government-Sponsered Enterprises, the 
Community Reinvestement Act, and Home Ownership in Targeted Underserved Neighborhoods, 
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along with the mandates in the FHEFSSA for GSEs to increase their acquisition 
of loans to low-income and minority borrowers, allowed capital to easily flow 
into urban areas.96 The flow of capital into urban areas is theorized as 
accelerating gentrification because it allows for the building of an infrastructure 
that makes the area more attractive to middle- and upper-class residents. 97 Put 
another way, the so-called desirable residents follow the capital into the city 
which results in gentrification. 
In addition, federal government policies related to housing assistance 
for the poor are also helping to facilitate gentrification. Beginning in the 1930s, 
the federal government gave funds to local governments to provide and operate 
government-owned housing for the poor.98 Local governments were allotted 
wide latitude in deciding where to site public housing buildings.99 Working-
class and middle-class residents often objected to having public housing 
buildings located in their neighborhoods.100 As a result, local governments 
almost exclusively sited public housing in poorer inner-city neighborhoods.101 
This led to the geographic isolation of poor persons in public housing and 
concentrated poverty.102 
Concentrated poverty, scholars theorize, has pernicious side-effects, 
particularly a lack of positive role models, increased criminal activity, and 
maladjusted social behavior.103 Inspired by such theories regarding public 
in HOUSING MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY 209 (2009) (noting that the FHEFSSA targeted 
underserved communities and in so doing defined the proportion of each GSE’s annual loan 
purchases that must derive from lower-income borrowers, borrowers residing in lower-income 
communities, and borrowers in certain “high minority” neighborhoods or “underserved areas”). 
96  See, e.g., Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 247. 
97  See Neil Smith, Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by 
Capital, Not People, 45 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 538, 547 (1979) (concluding that gentrification is 
spurred by people taking advantage of the return of capital to the city). 
98  See United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437–1440 (2013); Alexander von 
Hoffman, A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of The Housing Act of 1949, 11 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 299, 302 (2000) (noting that “[t]he Housing Act of 1937 established a 
federal public housing authority to make loans, grants, and annual contributions to local public 
housing agencies to develop, acquire, and manage housing projects”). 
99  See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and 
Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1292 (1995) (noting 
that the federal-local structure of public housing placed the decision of where to locate public 
housing in the hands of local governments). 
100  See von Hoffman, supra note 98, at 315 (“Working- and middle-class people objected, 
sometimes violently, to the development of housing projects in their neighborhoods.”). 
101  See id. (“In response to site controversies, housing authorities built new housing projects 
near old ones, thus concentrating public housing in certain working- and lower-class areas of the 
city.”). 
102  See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, 
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987). 
103  See Schill & Wachter, supra note 99, at 1289. 
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housing and concentrated poverty, a movement ensued to eliminate public 
housing buildings and to deconcentrate poverty by dispersing persons residing 
in public housing buildings.104 Through the Housing Opportunities for 
Everyone (“HOPE”) VI program, public housing projects were demolished and 
residents were provided with vouchers to pay their rent in privately owned 
buildings.105 The HOPE VI program also encouraged privatization of formerly 
public housing projects through the forming of relationships with developers to 
build mixed-income housing developments, purportedly as a way to remedy the 
ill effects of the poor being geographically isolated in public housing 
projects.106 
Mixed-income housing was supposed to replace the previously 
demolished public housing units. In many cases, however, the housing stock 
was either not replaced or not replaced in high enough numbers to allow 
significant numbers of prior public housing residents to be placed in the new 
mixed-income developments.107 Further, while HOPE VI aimed to 
deconcentrate poverty by relocating former public housing residents to higher 
income areas, source of income discrimination—a phenomenon in which 
landlords lawfully declined to accept the vouchers that Hope VI residents 
received to assist them in paying their rent—was prevalent.108 As a result, it 
was often nearly impossible for the former public housing residents to relocate 
anywhere within the city, causing them to leave the city altogether.109 The exit 
of poor people along with increasing land where public housing projects once 
104  See 42 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1)–(4) (2013); SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI:
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 14 (2004), http://www.urban.org/research/pub 
lication/decade-hope-vi (“A central premise of HOPE VI—and of the broader public housing 
transformation effort that began in the 1990s—was that the overconcentration of profoundly 
poor, nonworking households was a major contributor to the high levels of social problems in 
distressed public housing.”). 
105  POPKIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 14 (describing a central focus of HOPE VI as helping 
residents relocate to better neighborhoods). 
106  See id. at 15. 
107  See Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification: Lessons 
Learned from the D.C. Housing Authority’s Hope VI Projects, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 353, 360 (2001). 
108  See Danya E. Keene & Arline T. Geronimus, “Weathering” HOPE VI: The Importance of 
Evaluating the Population Health Impact of Public Housing Demolition and Displacement, 88 J. 
URB. HEALTH 417, 421 (2011) (finding that one of the challenges that the HOPE VI program 
faced in successfully relocating residents to better neighborhoods was the lack of incentive by 
landlords to accept vouchers in a tight rental market and general discrimination against voucher 
holders by landlords). 
109  See Cunningham, supra note 107, at 361 (noting that deconcentration did not make sense 
in a market where the poor face tremendous obstacles in finding housing anywhere). 
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stood paved the way for private development.110 The private development in 
turn attracted middle- and upper-class residents, thereby resulting in 
gentrification.111 
C. The Consequences of Gentrification 
The economic development and housing policies described above are 
achieving varying levels of success in luring middle-class residents and 
businesses to urban cities. As noted by other scholars, as a result of these policy 
interventions, many urban cities are undergoing a spatial, social, racial, and 
economic transformation that has important ramifications for both new and old 
residents.112 The assessment of whether gentrification is ultimately beneficial 
varies wildly depending upon the lens through which the benefits and 
drawbacks are weighed. 
On the one hand, some argue that gentrification provides much needed 
economic stability to declining urban cities by increasing their tax base and 
ensuring that public services are improved.113 Such improvements purportedly 
benefit the city as a whole, including poor and minority residents.114 Put 
another way, supporters of gentrification suggest that the rising tide of 
gentrification lifts all boats. The influx of middle-class and affluent white 
residents is thought to trickle down to the original low-income minority 
residents who were previously stuck in an area with subpar conditions, but who 
lacked the economic, political, and social capital to remedy the conditions prior 
to the arrival of middle-class and affluent white gentrifiers.115 
110  See Adalberto Aguirre, Jr. & Jonathan Brooks, City Redevelopment Policies and the 
Criminalization of Homelessness: A Narrative Case Study, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN 
REDEVELOPMENT 75, 94–95 (Kevin Fox Gotham ed., 2001). 
111  See Smith, supra note 97, at 547 (suggesting that people follow capital into cities, thereby 
accelerating gentrification). 
112  See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 17, at 26 (“The urban spatial restructuring taking place in 
cities is called gentrification as it applies to neighborhoods that are changing. The term 
restructuring keeps us focused on the fact that there is a deliberate, as well as structural, 
dimension to the changes taking place in the city.”); powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 437–42 
(describing the racial and economic transformations that occur in cities as a result of 
gentrification). 
113  See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 30, at 405–06 (arguing that gentrification is good for all urban 
residents of gentrifying areas because “increases in the number of affluent and well-educated 
residents is plainly good for cities, on balance, by increasing the number of residents who can 
pay taxes, purchase local goods and services, and support the city in state and federal political 
processes”). 
114  Id. at 406. 
115  See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Rhetoric and Realities of Gentrification: Reply to powell and 
Spencer, 46 HOW. L.J. 491, 494 (2003) (“A central aspect of my argument is that the market will 
not provide adequate low-income housing in cities, that more public funds must be made 
available, and that gentrification creates wealth that can be taxed to provide this housing.”); 
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Critics of gentrification on the other hand suggest that gains to 
gentrified urban areas do not trickle down to the original residents, particularly 
poor and minority residents.116 Instead, critics suggest that gentrification causes 
displacement of original residents and that the benefits of gentrification accrue 
almost exclusively to the middle- and upper-class and typically white 
residents.117 While the actual evidence regarding resident displacement caused 
by gentrification is contested and subject to much debate,118 there is little 
question that gentrification causes changes to communities and that the original 
residents of those neighborhoods bear a tremendous burden in adapting to those 
changes.119 As discussed in the next section, gentrification of urban areas has 
important implications for public schools similar to those that exist with respect 
to gentrification in the broader sense. 
III. GENTRIFICATION AND URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In addition to the economic development and housing policies, this 
Article takes the position that the current resurgence of gentrification is being 
further fueled by the enactment of local public school reforms. This is the case 
because the residents driving the resurgence of gentrification tend to be young 
middle-class white professionals120 who enter urban cities—at least initially—
without children or with small children who are not school-aged.121 
Conventional wisdom previously held that once this demographic had children, 
they would either send their children to private school or “concede to the 
suburban dream and move to an area with a better school system.”122 This is no 
Andres Duany, Three Cheers for “Gentrification,” AM. ENTERPRISE 37, 38 (2001) 
(“Gentrification usually benefits the present owners. They receive better prices for their homes if 
they sell. If they remain, there is a general improvement in quality of life as a result of improved 
consumer services, higher tax bases, and the beneficial effects of middle-class vigilance over 
municipal services.”). 
116  See powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 434 (arguing that gentrification is not good for 
the poor or for the city as a whole and that the state manipulates the housing market in favor of 
gentrifiers and is not poised to use gentrification to redistribute resources to help poor minority 
residents). 
117  See id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  While whites are commonly seen as the primary agents of gentrification, Blacks and other 
minorities can also be gentrifiers. See, e.g., Loretta Lees, A Reappraisal of Gentrification: 
Towards a “Geography of Gentrification,” 24 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 389, 403 (2000) 
(noting that Blacks and Latinos are often portrayed as the victims of gentrification but that they 
too can be gentrifiers in predominantly poor minority communities). However, for purposes of 
this Article, the focus lies on gentrification by predominantly white residents, as understandings 
regarding the impacts of non-white gentrification are still rather nascent and developing. 
121  See CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 202–06. 
122  McFarlane, supra note 17, at 15. 
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longer automatically the case. While urban schools in most gentrifying areas 
are still undoubtedly predominately minority and poor, an increasing number of 
young middle-class white residents with children are deciding to give the urban 
public schools a chance.123 Some local officials see this as an opportunity to 
retain white middle-class residents with children who would otherwise leave 
the city for suburban schools. They recognize however, that in order to attract 
such gentrifiers to urban public schools, changes to the school system must be 
made.124 
This section examines a budding connection between some urban 
public school reforms and efforts by localities to sustain gentrification. It 
briefly describes the current conditions of urban public schools and how white 
middle-class flight from urban schools helped to create these conditions. It then 
examines the ways in which urban public school reform efforts have shifted 
away from judicially-based reforms to more choice and market-oriented 
reforms. It concludes by documenting the ways in which choice and market-
oriented reforms are being used to entice gentrifiers to enroll their children in 
urban schools and discussing the consequences of those efforts for poor and 
minority students. 
A. Middle-Class White Flight and Declining Urban Public School 
Conditions 
Just as white middle-class flight decimated urban cities, white middle-
class flight also decimated urban public schools. Due to the loss of middle-class 
and white residents and their children from urban cities, the majority of urban 
schools have a student population in which the majority of students are poor 
and minority.125 As other scholars have noted, the absence of middle-class 
123  See, e.g., Tara Malone, More Families Sticking with City and Private Schools on North 
and Northwest Sides, CHI. TRIB. (July 19, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-07-
19/news/ct-met-chicago-parents-stay-put-20110731_1_private-schools-enrollment-magnet 
(suggesting that Chicago “Mayor Rahm Emanuel, focused early on improving public education 
offerings as a lifeblood for economic growth”). 
124  See Maia Bloomfield Cucchiara, Cities Are Trying to Fix Their Schools by Luring the 
Middle Class: It Won’t Work, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2013/10/cities-are-trying-to-fix-their-schools-by-luring-the-middle-class-it-
wont-work/280390/ (describing an initiative between Philadelphia business and education leaders 
to improve Philadelphia public schools and market the high performing schools to middle-class 
parents in the Center City District). 
125  See GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, CIV. RTS. PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT 
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 15 (2014), http://civilrightsproject.ucla 
.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat 
-and-an-uncertain-future (analyzing student enrollment data and finding that the majority of 
students in central city or urban school districts are Black and Latino and that more than 90% of 
students in the majority of Black and Latino schools are classified as low-income); James E. 
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students and racial diversity within urban public schools has important 
implications for the quality of education that students receive in urban public 
schools.126 
For example, public schools that lack middle-class students often have 
unequal access to important educational inputs such as quality teachers and 
curriculum.127 This is true of many urban schools as they consistently have 
teachers with lesser accreditations than suburban teachers and often offer fewer 
advanced placement or college level curriculum.128 Further, poor students tend 
to have more social and academic needs due to the effects of concentrated 
poverty.129 As a result, it costs more to effectively educate students in a school 
in which the majority of students are poor.130 Yet, as a result of the limited tax 
base that exists in many urban cities, urban public schools typically suffer from 
inadequate funding relative to the needs of their student population.131 Finally, 
the amalgamation of racial isolation and high levels of poverty in urban schools 
arguably is amongst the reasons that students in urban public schools perform 
significantly worse on indicators of academic achievement than students in 
Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 272 (1999) (“Urban schools are attended 
primarily by African-American and Hispanic students.”). 
126  For a comprehensive examination of the negative effects of racially and economically 
segregated schools, see GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIV. RTS. PROJECT, WHY SEGREGATION
MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY (2005), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/rese 
arch/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/why-segregation-matters-poverty-and-educational-
inequality. 
127  See Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the 
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 409–10 (2012) (noting the resources 
schools with predominately middle-class student bodies have that schools with more low-income 
students do not have). 
128  See, e.g., Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School 
Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1629 (2007) (arguing that teachers in low-income 
urban schools are “often less qualified, lower paid, and may be overwhelmed in classrooms with 
a disproportionate number of at-risk students”); Myrna Mandlawitz, A Tale of 3 Cities: Urban 
Perspectives on Special Education, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y 1, 28 (2003), http://www.cep-
dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=115 (finding that general education teachers in urban 
areas are often not qualified in the subjects they teach). 
129   See Black, supra note 127, at 411 (“[T]he need for intensive instructional and social 
service programs tends to be significantly higher in high-poverty schools.”). 
130  See Ryan, supra note 125, at 285 (“[S]chools with large concentrations of impoverished 
students will face the greatest educational costs, even before factoring in such additional services 
as security or counseling, and even without considering the different prices for educational goods 
and services in cities as opposed to suburbs or rural areas.”). 
131  See Wilson, supra note 70, at 1422 (describing the ways in which school district boundary 
lines dictate funding resources and noting that “school districts in poorer, typically predominately 
minority localities have fewer resources and educational inputs to offer relative to the need of 
their students”). 
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suburban schools.132 The combination of all of these issues results in most 
urban schools being categorized as low quality schools. 
Efforts to improve the aforementioned conditions in urban public 
schools, particularly the racial and socioeconomic isolation, have and continue 
to be made through both the judicial and legislative branches at the state and 
federal level. For much of the mid- to late 20th century, attempts were made 
through federal school desegregation litigation.133 Importantly however, in 
most urban cities, racial isolation in schools is caused by residential racial 
segregation between the suburbs and urban cities rather than de jure school 
segregation policies.134 As a result, in order to racially integrate urban schools 
in any meaningful way, courts would have to allow for a desegregation order 
between a suburban and urban school system. 
Unfortunately, the possibility of a court issuing such a desegregation 
order was for all practical purposes foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Milliken v. Bradley (“Milliken I”).135 There, the Court found that a federal 
district court could not require an inter-district school desegregation plan 
between a suburban school system and city school system to be implemented 
unless there was proof of an inter-district violation.136 Put another way, the 
court in Milliken I required proof that “racially discriminatory acts of one or 
more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district” before it 
would issue an inter-district desegregation order.137 This is a very difficult 
standard to meet. Indeed, only a handful of courts have ordered an inter-district 
desegregation since the Court’s decision in Milliken I.138 
In light of Milliken I and the realities of racial segregation in urban 
schools, many legal advocates shifted away from attempting to racially 
integrate urban public schools and instead focused on school funding in an 
132  See Ryan, supra note 125, at 286–93. 
133  See generally Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan 
Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825 (1996). 
134  It is important to note however, that residential segregation between the suburbs and urban 
cities was very much caused by explicit federal, state, and local policies. Yet the Supreme Court 
does not recognize this state action as sufficient to trigger court mandated school desegregation 
orders. See generally Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality Through the No 
Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 625, 649–51 (2011) 
(analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial residential segregation in 
the suburbs and urban cities). 
135  418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974). 
136  Id. at 741–43. 
137  Id. at 745. 
138  See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 433 
(8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1117 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 764 (3d Cir. 1978), superseded by statute, 14 DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 14, § 1004 (2015); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1359 (6th Cir. 
1974) (per curiam). 
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effort to make sure racially and economically segregated urban schools were at 
least appropriately funded.139 This approach found only moderate success. 
Several state courts have issued orders finding that local systems of public 
school finance violate state constitutional provisions regarding a student’s 
fundamental right to an education.140 However, most state courts also tend to 
take a very limited view of their remedial authority. They often decline to order 
remedies that require state legislatures to make specific budgetary 
allocations.141 Instead, they emphasize that judicial intervention in the state 
budgeting process is warranted only in very limited circumstances.142 As a 
result, state legislatures are often left with wide discretion to craft funding 
schemes. In turn, all too often state legislatures create schemes that are 
insufficient at remedying funding disparities and inadequacies.143 Thus, the 
combination of school-desegregation litigation and challenges to the ways in 
which states fund urban schools has done little to improve racial isolation and 
inadequate resources in urban public schools. 
139  See generally Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the 
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative 
Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 553 (1998) (attributing the shift from equity theory to adequacy 
theory in school-finance litigation to state court decisions’ inability to materially affect 
centralization or total education spending). 
140  Id. at 571. 
141  See, e.g., Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1156–58 (Mass. 2005) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (declining to order a cost study pertaining to educational inadequacies 
in part because of the “difficult issue of forcing the Legislature to appropriate more money” and 
therefore finding that the state was not violating the Massachusetts Constitution’s education 
clause by not providing an adequate education to students); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. 
State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 57 (N.Y. 2006) (reversing the court of appeals’s directive to the state 
legislature to calculate the cost of a sound basic education for New York public school students, 
reasoning that “[t]he role of the courts is not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine the best 
way to calculate the cost of a sound basic education in New York City schools, but to determine 
whether the State’s proposed calculation of that cost is rational”). 
142  See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 59 (“Judicial intervention in the 
state budget ‘may be invoked only in the narrowest of instances.’” (quoting Wein v. Carey, 362 
N.E.2d 587, 592 (N.Y. 1977))); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 
S.W.3d 746, 785, 792 (Tex. 2005) (finding that the system of school financing did not violate the 
education provision of the Texas state Constitution and reasoning that “[i]f the Legislature’s 
choices are informed by guiding rules and principles properly related to public education—that 
is, if the choices are not arbitrary—then the system does not violate the constitutional 
provision”). 
143  See Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 755, 758 (2004) (arguing that even when state legislatures increase funding for all public 
schools, most school funding legislation does not place a cap on how much districts can spend on 
students thereby allowing wealthier districts to continue to drastically outspend poorer districts). 
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B. The Rise of Market-Based Public School Reforms 
Faced with a federal judiciary that has seemingly receded from the 
business of mandating racial integration in urban schools along with state 
judiciaries that are often unwilling to go far enough in ensuring adequate 
funding for urban schools, those looking to improve urban public schools are 
now more likely to look outside of the federal or state judiciary. Significantly, 
non-judicial attempts to reform urban school conditions rely heavily on the 
theory that infusing market-based principles into urban public school systems is 
the answer to improving urban public schools.144 
This line of reasoning suggests that poor and minority parents and 
students in urban schools should have agency in the form of school choice to 
improve the educational opportunities available to them, just as affluent and 
white suburban parents typically have.145 It further theorizes that public schools 
should have to compete for students just as business and private schools 
compete for consumers.146 Introducing such competition is said to be an 
effective way to compel public schools to relinquish the geographical 
monopoly that they currently have on students and to hold them accountable to 
students and parents.147 Under this model, schools that fail to offer quality 
education will lose the competition for students and cease to exist.148 The 
model further proposes that schools should have the ability to be innovative and 
flexible so that parents can choose from a variety of different types of schools 
that would best suit their child.149 
To that end, most public school reforms currently being used to 
improve urban schools follow what this Article refers to as “market-based 
reforms.” These are reforms that promote free-market principles—such as 
144  See Pauline Lipman & David Hursh, Renaissance 2010: The Reassertion of Ruling-Class 
Power Through Neoliberal Policies in Chicago, 5 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 160, 162 (2007) 
(suggesting that most public school reforms are defined by a commitment to neoliberalism, or an 
individual liberty, unfettered participation in the market, and a limited role for the state, and 
noting that “the current educational emphasis on choice, competition, markets, standardized 
testing and accountability[,]” particularly with respect to urban schools, is based on neoliberal 
rationales). 
145  See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Supreme Court’s Role in the Growing School Choice 
Movement, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 37, 56–63 (2006) (noting the ways in which affluent parents are able 
to exercise choice in schools through their residential location or paying for private school and 
chronicling efforts to increase the choices available to poor minority families through school 
vouchers, charter schools, and intradistrict school choice programs). 
146  See Lipman & Hursh, supra note 144, at 167. 
147  See Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 909, 918–19 (2007) (“When the local district in which a parent lives is the only one 
where a parent may send a child tuition free, each local school district is a monopoly provider.”). 
148  Id. at 921–22. 
149  See Lipman & Hursh, supra note 144, at 167–68. 
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individual choice and competition—as a way to reform public schools. The 
most prominent forms of market-based reforms include closing so-called 
under-enrolled or poor performing traditional schools and increasing the 
number of charter schools in urban areas.150 
Market-based reforms initially gained momentum at the federal level. 
Federal officials adopted market-based reforms as a means of reducing 
achievement gaps between minority and poor students and white middle-class 
students.151 Two pieces of federal public education reform legislation in 
particular, the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”)152 and the Race to the Top 
initiative,153 laid the groundwork for the market-based public school reforms 
that are now filtering down to the state and local level. 
NCLB incorporates market-based reforms by requiring schools to make 
Adequate Yearly Progress (“AYP”) towards academic proficiency for all 
students, as measured by the students’ performance on standardized tests.154 If a 
school fails to make AYP for two consecutive years it must allow students the 
choice of transferring to another public school.155 It also requires schools that 
fail to make AYP for five consecutive years to surrender control to the state, 
which then has the option of closing the school and reopening it as a charter 
school.156 While there is evidence to suggest that few schools have been closed 
150  See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1772–73 (2012) (chronicling the failure of traditional civil rights litigation to 
improve racial integration in and quality of urban public schools and the embrace of charter 
schools as an alternative to improving education for minority students); Nicole Stelle Garnett, 
Disparate Impact, School Closures, and Parental Choice, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 290–92 
(describing the increasing number of public school closures and noting that, “[p]arental choice 
policies are . . . empowering parents to exit traditional public schools for charter schools . . . 
[and] suppress[ing] public school enrollment in many urban districts”); Osamudia R. James, Opt-
Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1115–16 (2014) 
(describing the affinity towards charter schools as being rooted in part by “the failure of 
integration to close the achievement gap, the white flight that many desegregation plans 
prompted, and the negative racial incidents to which students of color are subjected”). 
151  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3) (2013) (noting in the NCLB statement of purpose that a goal 
of the Act is to “clos[e] the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children, 
especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between 
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers”); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE
TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2009), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/ 
executive-summary.pdf (stating that a primary purposes of the Race to the Top Initiative is to 
“achiev[e] significant improvement in student outcomes, including making substantial gains in 
student achievement, closing achievement gaps”). 
152  Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.). 
153  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 1. 
154  20 U.S.C. § 6316(a)(1)(A). 
155  Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E). 
156  Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i). 
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directly as a result of the NCLB school closure option, states are independently 
adopting their own accountability statutes that mirror NCLB, closing schools 
pursuant to those statutes, and replacing them with charter schools.157 Thus, 
NCLB’s focus on closing underperforming schools and replacing them with 
charter schools significantly contributed to the ongoing movement to reform 
urban public education by replacing traditional public schools with charter 
schools.158 
The second piece of federal legislation, the Race to the Top initiative, 
is a competitive grant funding program that awards grants to states if they, 
among other things, “ensur[e] successful conditions for high-performing 
charters and other innovative schools.”159 This funding provision incorporates 
market-based reforms by encouraging the expansion of charter schools.160 
Indeed, many states are following suit by amending their charter-enabling 
provisions to make it easier to establish charter schools.161 As discussed in 
further detail in the next section, the market-based reforms encouraged at the 
federal level are paving the way for wholesale urban public school reform at 
the local level. The reforms are being used at the local level, at least in part, to 
make urban public schools more attractive for gentrifying families. 
C. The Connection Between Urban Public School Reforms and 
Gentrification 
While market-based public school reforms for the most part 
proliferated at the federal level, because of a strong adherence to localism in 
American public education, the reforms are executed by local government 
157  See JENNIFER MCMURRER & SHELBY MCINTOSH, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF TITLE I SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANTS UNDER THE
RECOVERY ACT 2 (2012), http://www.cep-dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=398; U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT:
VOLUME IX—ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER NCLB: FINAL REPORT (2010), https://www2.ed.gov/rschs 
tat/eval/disadv/nclb-accountability/nclb-accountability-final.pdf. 
158  See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the 
Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 24 (2010) (“[E]fforts to 
improve the academic performance of the nation’s public schools revitalized the school-choice 
movement regarding public charter schools.”). 
159  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 3. 
160  Id. at 11 (listing as a criterion for receiving a Race to the Top grant that “[t]he State has a 
charter school law that does not prohibit or effectively inhibit increasing the number of high-
performing charter schools”). 
161  See Education Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx (last visited Nov. 
5, 2015) (noting the number of states that have enacted or amended their state charter laws to 
allow for the expansion in the number of charter schools). 
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officials.162 At the local level, local government officials often share the goal of 
using market-based reforms to close achievement gaps and increase the quality 
of schools available to students. In many gentrifying urban areas, however, 
local officials are also looking towards market-based reforms to increase the 
quality of urban schools—or at least the perception surrounding the quality of 
urban schools—in order to retain and recruit middle class white gentrifiers with 
school-aged children.163 
Market-based reforms, particularly with their emphasis on creating 
more parental and student choice, are part of a legitimate attempt to improve 
urban school systems that are often in dire need of repair.164 Indeed, the closing 
of failing or underutilized traditional public schools and expansion of charter 
schools is supposed to help improve the educational opportunities available to 
all students, including poor and minority students. Similar to the theory 
regarding gentrification being the tide which raises all boats, some suggest that 
enacting market-based, public school reforms as a means to keep middle-class 
white families in public school systems will benefit all students in urban school 
systems.165 
To be sure, the greatest benefit that getting middle-class white 
gentrifiers to enroll their children in urban public schools brings is the ability to 
reintegrate urban schools which are now hyper-segregated as a result of 
middle-class white flight to suburban school districts.166 The benefits of 
162  For a discussion of how localism in the American system of public education works, see 
Wilson, supra note 134, at 632–35. 
163  See, e.g., Barras, supra note 16, at 2 (describing former D.C. Chancellor of Schools 
Michelle Rhee’s attempts to recruit parents and noting that the places within Washington, D.C., 
where Rhee’s recruitment attempts were most focused, tended to be “gentrified locales where 
demographics have shifted . . . but neighborhood schools remain overwhelmingly African-
American”); CENT. PHILA. DEV. CORP. & CTR. CITY DIST., GROWING SMARTER: THE ROLE OF
CENTER CITY’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN ENHANCING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF PHILADELPHIA 6 (2004),
http://www.centercityphila.org/docs/growingsmarterreport2004.pdf (“A generation ago, young 
professionals fled with their families to the suburbs. Philadelphia’s public schools now have a 
historic opportunity to capitalize on a decade of positive change, to ensure the sustainability of 
Center City’s remarkable revival and to retain a larger percentage of Philadelphia residents with 
college degrees.”). 
164  See, e.g., Davis & Oakley, supra note 20, at 99 (finding that the emergence of charter 
schools in gentrifying areas is a tool of both urban revitalization efforts and legitimate attempts at 
school reform). 
165  See, e.g., STILLMAN, supra note 9, at 1 (arguing that the “arrival of the children of the 
gentry” has the potential to improve racial segregation and poverty which contribute to poor 
learning outcomes in urban schools); Emily Badger, How Diverse Schools Could Help Fight the 
Worst Effects of Gentrification, CITYLAB (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2013/ 
04/how-diverse-schools-could-help-fight-worst-effects-gentrification/5294/ (suggesting that 
gentrification “raises the possibility—albeit a fleeting one —that long-segregated schools in 
urban American might finally, if uneasily integrate”). 
166  See GARY ORFIELD, JOHN KUCSERA & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 
E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 41–42 
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attending racially and economically integrated schools have long been 
documented.167 Thus, market-based reforms that are successful in increasing 
racial and economic balance in urban public schools have the potential to 
benefit poor and minority students as well. Such reforms are necessary because 
gentrifiers often cite the state of urban public schools as the primary reason 
they would consider leaving the city.168 In contrast, middle-class white parents 
who decide to remain in urban areas often express a desire to have a 
marketplace of public school options so that in the event their neighborhood 
school is low quality, they can shop outside of their neighborhood school for a 
better school for their child.169 
Operating under the premise that market-based reforms will improve 
public schools in ways that will entice gentrifiers to send their kids to urban 
public schools, local officials are expanding upon the types of market-based 
school reforms contained in the Race to the Top Initiative and NCLB 
legislation, at least in part this Article suggests, to make their school systems 
more attractive for gentrifying families. The market-based reforms being 
implemented in gentrifying cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, 
D.C., provide illustrative examples of the ways in which market-based reforms 
are being used to cater to the interests of gentrifiers in an attempt to get them to 
enroll their children in urban schools. 
1. Chicago
Chicago is the birthplace of market-based public school reforms. 
Indeed, several of the reforms adopted in the federal NCLB and Race to the 
(2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-
national/e-pluribus. . .separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more-
students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf (finding that the typical white student 
attends a school where three quarters of their peers are white). 
167  See, e.g., id. at 6–11 (describing the relationship between racially and economically 
segregated schools and poor academic performance); Black, supra note 127, at 409–10 
(documenting the benefits of racially and economically integrated schools, including more 
advanced curricula, better teachers, and higher expectations for students). 
168  See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Schools Dilemma for Urban Gentrifiers: Keep Their Kids 
Urban, or Move to Suburbia?, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/local/education/schools-dilemma-for-urban-gentrifiers-keep-their-kids-urban-or-move-to-
suburbia/2012/10/14/02083b6c-131b-11e2-a16b-2c110031514a_story.html (describing the 
decision-making process of a white, middle-class family who left Washington, D.C., for the 
suburbs because of the condition of Washington, D.C., public schools). 
169  See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1288 (2005) (reviewing ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN
TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE
(WITH SURPRISING SOLUTIONS THAT WILL CHANGE OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURES) (2004)) (suggesting 
that incorporating a robust public choice program will increase the number of white, middle-class 
families willing to enroll their children in urban public schools); Posey, supra note 5, at 12. 
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Top Initiative began on a smaller scale in Chicago.170 In particular, in 2004 the 
Chicago Board of Education passed an initiative called Renaissance 2010 
(“Ren10”), an initiative that sought to transform public education through 
innovative charter and contract schools.171 Importantly, when Ren10 was 
created, local officials made an explicit connection between reforming the 
schools through Ren10 and attracting new residents to parts of the city in which 
public housing was being replaced with mixed-income housing.172 The stated 
goal of the new schools was to “provide all families—regardless of their socio-
economic standing—with options for a high-quality public education.”173 The 
new schools were given autonomy and independence, but in exchange they 
were required to agree to higher levels of accountability, including having their 
students’ achievement measured by a separate set of metrics in addition to 
standardized tests.174 
In order to open the new schools, Ren10 embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to close low-performing schools.175 Eventually however, the 
initiative morphed from closing low-performing schools to consolidating and 
closing schools with low enrollment, even if the schools were academically 
successful.176 While Ren10 is no longer in operation, the residue of Ren10 
remains as numerous traditional Chicago public schools were closed, almost all 
of which were in predominately Black and Latino neighborhoods.177 
170  See Pauline Lipman, Contesting the City: Neoliberal Urbanism and the Cultural Politics 
of Education Reform in Chicago, 32 STUD. CULTURAL POL. EDUC. 217–18 (2011) (describing 
Chicago as the incubator of neoliberal education policies, particularly school closures and the 
expansion of charter and contract schools, and describing the ways in which federal public school 
reforms were modeled off of Chicago’s reforms). 
171  See Renaissance 2010, CHI. PUB. SCHS., http://www.cps.edu/programs/districtinitiatives/ 
pages/renaissance2010.aspx (last modified Aug. 8, 2011). 
172  Lipman, supra note 170, at 223 (noting that the Chicago Metropolitan Planning Council 
made a direct connection between gentrification and the Ren10 formation with one official 
stating that they should embark upon a plan to market the new schools created by Ren10 to 
“parents considering moving into new mixed-income communities”). 
173  KATIE FURTICK, REASON FOUND., ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT 2014: EDUCATION 43
(2014), http://reason.org/files/apr-2014-education.pdf. 
174  Id. 
175  See Lipman, supra note 170, at 222. 
176  See id. 
177  See id. at 221–22 (noting that as of Spring 2010, Chicago Public Schools had consolidated 
or phased out 59 schools and opened 92 schools: 46 of which were charter schools, 15 of which 
were contract schools operated by private service providers, and 31 of which were Renaissance 
public “performance” schools that operated with a five-year renewable performance contract). 
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2. Philadelphia
In Philadelphia, the downtown Center City area is undergoing 
significant gentrification.178 Local officials quickly realized that in order to 
sustain the gentrification, changes had to be made to make the Philadelphia 
public schools a more attractive option for gentrifiers with school-aged 
children.179 As a result, Philadelphia school administrators and a local business 
improvement district called Center City District (“CCD”) created a partnership 
called the Center City Schools Initiative (“CCSI”). The stated purposes of the 
CCSI were to (i) infuse business marketing schemes targeted towards the 
professional workers in Center City and (ii) make changes to the school 
system’s administrative- and student-assignment processes in order to keep 
gentrifiers from leaving once their children reached school age.180 
In order to accomplish its purpose, CCSI restructured the way in which 
the Philadelphia public schools were organized. It created a new academic unit 
within the Philadelphia Public School System called the Center City Region 
(“CCR”).181 The CCR encompasses only schools in the gentrified City Center 
area.182 Further, the CCR schools were “deliberately constructed and managed 
to appeal to professional parents.”183 Indeed, the CCR schools were marketed to 
middle- and upper-class parents by highlighting the CCR schools’ membership 
within an elite cadre of the Philadelphia public school system.184 Center City 
parents were also heavily recruited by CCR officials, including CCR officials 
organizing elaborate dinner parties in which parents with children were invited 
to attend and “pitched” to send their children to CCR schools.185 
Finally, the school admission and assignment policy for the schools 
within the CCR was changed so that children who reside in the CCR catchment 
178  See CENT. PHILA. DEV. CORP. & CTR. CITY DIST., supra note 163, at 1 (“Center City has 
become the preferred residence for the region’s young college-educated adults—future parents of 
the region’s school children. More than 30% of Center City’s 80,000 residents—24,000 people—
are between the ages of 25 and 34. Seventy-nine percent of this group have a college degree, but 
only 14% have children.”). 
179  Id. (“Attracting recent college graduates is only half the battle. Retaining them—as they 
become 35–44, have children, prosper in their professions, or succeed in their own businesses—
is key to Philadelphia’s prosperity.”). 
180  See Maia Cucchiara, Re-branding Urban Schools: Urban Revitalization, Social Status, 
and Marketing Public Schools to the Upper Middle Class, 23 J. EDUC. POL’Y 165, 165 (2008). 
181  Id. at 167. 
182  Id. at 169. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. at 171. 
185  Id. at 171–74 (summarizing efforts to recruit parents to Grant Elementary School, a school 
within the CCR, and noting the ways in which officials highlighted Grant’s unique position and 
how one parent was so heavily recruited that she stated “I’ve never felt so recruited in my 
life . . . . Like, I felt like if I had been an athlete, maybe I’d have gotten a car.”). 
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zone had first preference.186 Thus admission to CCR schools, which are the 
better performing schools in the city, for students living outside the CCR 
catchment zone, now occurs on a very limited basis.187 Although the CCR was 
dissolved in 2010, the marketing campaign combined with the changed 
admission policy had long-term effects on the demographics of Philadelphia 
public schools.188 The net result of the CCR was essentially the creation of a 
network of public schools within the Philadelphia public school system almost 
exclusively for the children of middle- and upper-class (and predominately 
white) gentrifiers.189 Similar changes to the school admission and assignment 
processes for the benefit of middle- and upper-class gentrifiers are also being 
made in other gentrifying urban cities. 190   
3. Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C., is also undergoing significant gentrification.191 
Similar to Philadelphia, reforming the public school system in order to make 
schools more palatable to young gentrifying families is also part of 
186  The school assignment process in Philadelphia was previously an open enrollment which 
allowed students to enroll in schools outside of their catchment zone on a frequent basis. 
187  Cucchiara, supra note 180, at 171. 
188  Id. at 184 (noting that after the dissolution of the CCR, “district data on student enrollment 
show that it had a significant, and lasting, impact”). 
189  Id. at 170 (noting that the creation of the CCD “with its unique educational market and 
high-status location signaled that it was a place where schools, parents and students would 
receive special treatment such as different rules and procedures around admissions, [and] a 
higher profile for the district”). 
190  See, e.g., Chase Billingham, Parental Choice, Neighborhood Schools, and the Market 
Metaphor in Urban Education Reform, 52 URBAN STUD. 685, 691 (2015). Changes that were 
made to Boston’s previous controlled choice school assignment policy which allowed poor 
minority families to escape poor performing neighborhood schools by allowing them to attend 
schools within a larger geographic assignment zone. Id. In 2013, a new system of neighborhood 
schools was implemented and “[t]hroughout the process, many municipal and business leaders 
drove home the argument that a return to neighborhood schools would prove instrumental in the 
city’s quest to attract and retain . . . new profession families, who [had] frequently expressed 
reluctance to live in the city lest their children be forced to attend an unacceptable public school.” 
Id. 
191  See Sabrina Tavernise, A Population Changes, Uneasily, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/us/18dc.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (finding that in 2011, 
Washington, D.C., lost its Black majority for the first time in 50 years and that the social fabric 
and character of neighborhoods were being changed); Gerry Widdicombe, The Fall and Rise of 
Downtown D.C., THE URBANIST (Jan. 2010) http://www.spur.org/publications/article/2010-01-
10/fall-and-rise-downtown-dc (describing the process by which downtown Washington, D.C., 
was transformed into a vibrant economic hub, noting the infusion of money from the private 
sector, tax breaks and subsidies that were given in order to revitalize the downtown areas, and the 
overall tax base of the District has increased). 
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Washington, D.C.’s stated larger economic development strategy.192 In 
Washington, D.C., as in many urban cities, an overwhelmingly Black public 
school system decayed after years of disinvestment and failed efforts to reform 
the school system through the courts.193 To be sure, the charter school 
movement emerged in Washington, D.C., as an alternative to the chronically 
failing schools.194 Yet local officials in Washington, D.C., are now openly 
using charter schools not only as a method of reforming their public school 
system, but also as a tool to attract and retain gentrifiers.195 
For example, local officials implemented a program called City Build 
which provided $1 million in funding for organizations to establish charter 
schools in gentrifying areas.196 Notably, the stated impetus for the City Build 
initiative was to attract and retain residents to the District with the hope of 
helping the Washington, D.C., mayor meet his stated goal of drawing 100,000 
new residents to the District.197 In addition, some parents in gentrifying 
neighborhoods, particularly the gentrified Capitol Hill neighborhood, took 
192  See, e.g., Barras, supra note 16, at 3 (describing how improvement in D.C. schools could 
increase the number of white gentrifiers who remain in the city and the implications for D.C.’s 
overall economy). 
193  See Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. 
Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967) (holding that the D.C. public schools still continued to segregate 
students by race after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and requiring them to 
make changes). 
194  See Matthew M. Cregor, Continuing the Conversations: School Integration by Race and 
Socioeconomic Status in Gentrifying Neighborhoods, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 595, 
603–04 (2006) (noting that “D.C.’s frustrating educational history, congressional oversight, and 
high national visibility have made it the battleground or breeding ground for a number of school 
reform movements”). 
195  Emma Brown, D.C. School Enrollment Increases, with Charters Growing Faster than 
DCPS, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/overall-dc-
school-enrollment-increases-with-charters-growing-faster-than-dcps/2013/10/17/0f8dd7fc-375e-
11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html (containing comments from Vincent Gray, D.C.’s Mayor, 
stating that the increase of student enrollment in Washington, D.C.’s public schools evidenced 
that they were a “great place” for families). 
196  See Office of the Superintendent of Educ., City Build, DC.GOV, 
http://osse.dc.gov/service/city-build (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (“The aim of City Build stretches 
beyond excellence in academics; it is a focus on encouraging community development, 
promoting strategic neighborhoods, attracting and retaining residents, and creating partnerships 
between public charter schools and community organizations.”). 
197  See Cregor, supra note 194, at 596–97 (describing the City Build Initiative as “the best 
near-term hope for attracting and retaining residents to the District, with the hope of helping to 
meet Mayor Williams’s stated goal of attracting 100,000 new residents” (quoting Press Release, 
District of Columbia, Sen. Landrieu, Mayor Williams Kick Off “City Build” Charter School 
Initiative (Aug. 18, 2004))). 
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matters into their own hands by creating a charter school for, and marketed 
almost exclusively to, parents in the gentrified Capitol Hill area.198 
In addition to charter school expansion, Washington, D.C., local 
government officials and school officials recently changed the boundary lines 
that determine student assignment to traditional public schools.199 The change 
was driven at least in part by a desire to provide predictability and stability in 
terms of school assignment for young families so that they would feel 
comfortable sending their kids to Washington, D.C., public schools.200 
D. The Impact of Market-Based Public School Reforms on Poor and 
Minority Students 
As the above examples in Washington, D.C., Chicago, and 
Philadelphia demonstrate, market-based public school reforms 
disproportionately affect poor minority students. For gentrified families, 
market-based reforms are for the most part a net positive. They actually work to 
give the families more viable choices when navigating urban public school 
systems with far too few high-quality options. Yet, market-based reforms 
typically have the opposite effect on the options available to poor and minority 
families. Instead of expanding the choices available to them, it constricts their 
choices. 
For example, the closing of traditional public schools is leaving many 
predominantly poor and minority neighborhoods with no traditional public 
schools within close proximity.201 In Chicago for example, a high number of 
poor minority neighborhoods are now considered “school deserts” or 
198  See Save Our Schs.- Se. & Ne. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-01500, 2006 WL 1827654, at 
*1 (D.D.C. July 3, 2006) (“Two Rivers, which was granted its charter in 2003 and began
operating in Fall 2004, was assertedly founded by affluent white families who felt that the 
District’s public school student body was ‘too black.’”); Cregor, supra note 194, at 605–08 
(describing the efforts of parents in the Washington, D.C., Capitol Hill area to create their own 
charter school because they were dissatisfied with the traditional public school offerings of the 
D.C. public school system). 
199  See D.C. ADVISORY COMM. ON STUDENT ASSIGNMENT, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES AND DCPS SCHOOL BOUNDARIES 14–19 (2014), http://dme.dc. 
gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dme/publication/attachments/Final%20Recommendations%20on%
20Student%20Assignment%208-18-14_0.pdf. 
200  Id. at 5 (“DC is currently in a period of child population growth across the city, but 
whether young families will stay in the District, where families with children will settle, how 
long families will stay, and how large the families will be will all have a tremendous effect on 
DCPS and the public charter schools. In addition, the quality and character of public education in 
the District of Columbia and of individual DCPS and charter schools will affect the residential 
and school choices of these families.”). 
201  See supra Part II.C. 
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communities without public schools in close proximity.202 Public school 
closures in predominately minority neighborhoods have the effect of 
destabilizing those neighborhoods because schools are often one of the most 
stable institutions in poor minority urban areas.203 Closing public schools in 
already distressed, predominately poor, and minority neighborhoods often 
leaves vacant buildings that can exacerbate blight in poor communities, and the 
vacant buildings become a magnet for crime.204 Indeed, many of the closed 
schools are not sold or repurposed for other uses.205 The remnants of the closed 
physical buildings can also take a psychological toll on members of the 
community, leading them to believe that their community was abandoned and 
no longer worthy of investment.206 This can in turn cause people to leave their 
communities, thereby depleting the neighborhood of critical social capital. 
The closing of traditional neighborhood public schools is supposed to 
be balanced out by the expansion of non-neighborhood based charter schools 
that are of higher quality. However, the ability to actually attend high quality 
charter schools often proves illusive for poor and minority students and parents. 
Indeed, the better and more selective charter schools are often oversubscribed 
202  See, e.g., Julianne Hing, Activists Say No to Another “School Desert” in Chicago, 
COLORLINES (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/12/activists_say_no_ 
to_another_school_desert_in_chicago.html (describing the high number of school closings in 
poor Black and Latino neighborhoods in Chicago and highlighting that the closure of public 
schools in the South Side Chicago neighborhood of Bronzeville will lead to there being only one 
public high school in close proximity for students to attend—a charter school two and a half 
miles away from Bronzeville). 
203  JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: RACISM, SCHOOL CLOSURES,
AND PUBLIC SCHOOL SABOTAGE 19 (2014), http://www.j4jalliance.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/02/J4JReport-final_05_12_14.pdf (noting that when public schools close “[r]esidents lose 
community services housed in schools, such as pre-K programs, before- and after-school 
programming, adult education classes, and health clinics. . . . Many of our communities 
experience a massive outflow of economic and human capital, which they can ill afford 
considering they were already substantially under-resourced.”). 
204  See, e.g., John Accordino & Gary T. Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned 
Property Problem, 22 J. URB. AFF. 301, 303 (2000) (“Ample evidence exists to suggest that such 
properties also have social ramifications, as they tend to serve as ‘magnets for crime’ and to 
increase the risks of fire and vandalism in urban neighborhoods.”). 
205  PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, SHUTTERED PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE STRUGGLE TO BRING OLD 
BUILDINGS NEW LIFE 1 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2013/02/11/Philad 
elphia_School_Closings_Report.pdf?la=en (“Since 2005, the 12 districts have sold, leased or 
reused a total of 267 properties and still have 301 unused sites on the market, empty buildings 
that can cast a pall over their neighborhoods and be costly to seal, maintain and insure.”). 
206  See Garnett, supra note 150, at 320 (summarizing anecdotal evidence to support claims 
that “[r]esidents might interpret a school closure as signaling that their community is no longer 
worthy of investment, especially when (as is frequently the case) demographic realities 
concentrate school closures in minority neighborhoods”). 
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and utilize a lottery process in order to gain admission.207 While in theory all 
participants in the lottery have an equal opportunity to gain admission, 
gentrifier families who tend to have more time, resources, and cultural capital 
to navigate the lottery process are more likely to apply and gain admission to 
the better charter schools.208 
In fact, the majority of poor and minority students are more likely to 
enroll in charter schools that perform equivalent to or worse than traditional 
public schools.209 Importantly, as a result of a steady stream of closures, many 
poor minority students are having to transfer to new schools multiple times 
within a short time period because schools are at times slated for closure 
shortly after accepting a batch of students from a previously closed school.210 
Thus, the expansion of charter schools arguably favors the interests of 
gentrifiers who are more likely to have the time and cultural capital to navigate 
the lottery process and obtain admission into the best charter schools. 
Closing traditional public schools and expanding the number of charter 
schools also comes at a cost to traditional public schools. Traditional public 
schools are much more likely to serve minorities, poor students, and students 
with serious social and academic needs.211 Indeed, it is well documented that 
charter schools tend to deny students with behavioral problems and students 
with disabilities.212 Closing large numbers of traditional public schools means 
that the few traditional public schools that remain open are forced to educate 
students who have more social and academic needs, but the schools have less 
money to do so because they lose state and local funding that follows students 
207  See, e.g., Conor Williams, What Applying to Charter Schools Showed Me About 
Inequality, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014 
/03/what-applying-to-charter-schools-showed-me-about-inequality/284530/ (noting that in 
Washington, D.C., the demand for quality seats greatly exceeded the supply and describing the 
lottery process by which seats are allocated). 
208  See, e.g., id. (describing how parents with more time and resources can increase their 
chances of obtaining a coveted spot in the charter school lottery by applying to more schools and 
having the ability to stand in line early in the morning to submit charter applications). 
209  JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra 203, at 12. 
210  Lipman, supra note 170, at 222 (noting that “[s]ome African-American students were 
transferred to as many as four schools in three years as one school after another was closed, and 
receiving schools were destabilized by the influx of dislocated students”). 
211  JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra note 203, at 11–12 (“Many charter schools also exclude 
students who are not perceived to be high-achievers or academically inclined. Charter schools 
use a variety of selective admission techniques, such as targeted marketing strategies, 
burdensome application processes, imposing academic prerequisites, and the active 
discouragement of less-desirable candidates.”). 
212  Id. at 12. 
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to charter schools.213 Poor and minority students, not the children of gentrifiers, 
are more likely to attend such under-resourced traditional public schools. 
Finally, gentrifiers are more likely to live in a neighborhood that has 
the best traditional public schools in the city.214 Thus, if they are unable to gain 
admission to a quality charter school they are more likely to be able to exercise 
their choice of enrolling in a traditional neighborhood public school. This is 
especially true in gentrifying localities that have changed their school 
enrollment policies to favor neighborhood school enrollment. For example, in 
Washington, D.C., the boundary-line reassignment plan resulted in the 
shrinking of the boundary lines in two of the fastest gentrifying parts of the 
city.215 
Indeed, the new attendance zones for the best performing middle and 
high schools in the city were shrunk so that only residents in the adjacent, 
predominately white, gentrified neighborhoods will have an automatic right to 
enroll in those schools.216 On the other hand, students in the predominately 
Black and poor Ward Seven section of the city217 were the most detrimentally 
impacted by the new boundary line changes. Over “1,266 students will be 
213  See, e.g., id.; Valerie Strauss, A Dozen Problems with Charter Schools, WASH. POST (May 
20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/05/20/a-dozen-
problems-with-charter-schools/ (summarizing the financial consequences of students moving 
from traditional public schools to charter schools and finding that “when a couple students leave 
a classroom to attend a charter school, that classroom still has to keep the lights on, and pay the 
teacher and the heating bill: the math is not a simple moving of dollars from one place to 
another”). 
214  See Japonica Brown-Saracino, Social Preservationists and the Quest for Authentic 
Community, in THE GENTRIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 28, at 261, 277–83. 
215  See Emma Brown, D.C. Releases New Boundaries Proposal with Emphasis on 
Neighborhood Schools, WASH. POST (June 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
education/dc-releases-new-boundaries-proposal-with-emphasis-on-neighborhood-schools/2014/0 
6/12/828e30b0-f245-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html?wpisrc=al_locmisc (“Most high 
school boundaries would also shift significantly, with some of the biggest changes at schools in 
the fastest-gentrifying parts of the city, such as Cardozo and Roosevelt. Cardozo’s zone, which 
currently extends far into Northeast Washington, would become an entirely Northwest school, 
encompassing wealthier neighborhoods around Dupont Circle and downtown that are currently 
zoned to Wilson.”). 
216  Michael Alison Chandler & Mike DeBonis, D.C. Mayor Gray Adopts New School 
Boundary Recommendations, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/local/education/dc-mayor-gray-adopts-new-school-boundary-recommendations/2014/08/21/9 
fed7d4a-249b-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html (“New attendance zones for Alice Deal 
Middle and Woodrow Wilson High—two Northwest schools that are among the most in-
demand—are smaller, with some neighborhoods that had access to them now sent to other 
schools.”). 
217  See D.C. ACTION FOR CHILDREN, A TALE OF THREE CITIES: WHAT THE CENSUS SAYS
ABOUT THE DISTRICT AND HOW WE MUST RESPOND 4, 7 (2011), https://www.dcactionfor 
children.org/sites/default/files/CensusBrief4-27-11%20FINAL_0.pdf (showing that Ward 7 has 
the largest Black population (90%) in the city and the highest rate of poverty (over 40%)). 
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reassigned to a new school and 945 will no longer have a choice” to attend a 
neighborhood school.218 This contrasts starkly with the impact on the 
predominately white and heavily gentrified Ward Three section of Washington, 
D.C., where no student will be reassigned to a new public school.219 In an 
attempt to mitigate the segregating effects of the new zone-assignment policy, a 
limited number of seats in the highest performing schools in the city were set 
aside for socio-economically disadvantaged students who can attempt to enroll 
in those seats through the out-of-boundary lottery.220 The out-of-boundary 
lottery, however, only offers a limited number of slots.221 Often the most 
desirable schools have no seats available for students who enter the out-of-
boundary lottery.222 
In the end, market-based reforms create an interest divergence between 
poor and minority families and students, on the one hand, and gentrifiers, on 
the other. They do so by expanding the choices available to gentrifier families 
while simultaneously constricting the choices available to poor and minority 
families and students. Despite the harmful and racially disproportionate effects 
of market-based reforms, they have thus far withstood legal challenge. As 
discussed in the next section, market-based reforms are likely to continue to 
withstand legal challenges and, as a result, legislative reforms may prove more 
effective in meeting both the needs of poor and minority students and gentrifier 
families. 
218  Aaron Wiener, Who’s Affected by the School-Assignment Changes, WASH. CITY PAPER 
(Aug. 21, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2014/0 
8/21/whos-affected-by-the-school-assignment-changes/. 
219  Id. (“Ward 3 will be the least affected, with no students reassigned.”). 
220  See Chandler & DeBonis, supra note 216 (“[A]t-risk students should have a preference in 
the lottery for 25 percent of all out-of-boundary seats in any given year in more-affluent 
schools.”). 
221  See D.C. PUB. SCHS., MY SCHOOL DC LOTTERY AND ENROLLMENT POLICY HANDBOOK 5
(2015), http://dcps.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dcps/publication/attachments/Lottery%20 
Policy%20Handbook4.pdf (describing the out-of-boundary lottery process as a lottery that allows 
a student “[t]o access a school that is not a right-to-attend school, also referred to as an out-of-
boundary school, in kindergarten through Grade 12”). 
222  See, e.g., Bill Turque, DCPS Lottery: A Look at the Available Seats, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dc-schools-insider/post/dcps-lottery-a-look-at-the-
available-seats/2012/02/03/gIQABTIpuQ_blog.html (noting that there was zero to one seat 
available, through the out-of-boundary lottery, in the majority of Washington, D.C.’s most 
affluent and coveted public schools in the upper northwest section of the city). 
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IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO MARKET-BASED REFORMS IN GENTRIFYING
URBAN CITIES AND THE INTEREST DIVERGENCE DILEMMA 
Poor minority students in gentrifying areas are bringing legal 
challenges to market-based reform practices, particularly school closures and 
charter school expansion.223 
Advocates bringing challenges to public school closures and charter 
school expansion have not made explicit the connection between gentrification 
and localities’ use of market-based public school reforms as an economic 
development tool to sustain gentrification.224 They are, however, challenging 
the harmful effects that public school closures and charter school expansion 
have on poor and minority students.225 To date, the legal challenges have not 
been successful. This section provides an overview of the various legal 
challenges made by advocates both in the courts and with administrative 
agencies. It then analyzes the reasons why these challenges are either not 
succeeding or are unlikely to succeed. 
A. Court-Based Challenges to Market-Based Public School Reforms 
The primary method of challenging the exclusionary effects of market-
based reforms thus far has been to seek relief from the courts or OCR. In 
particular, plaintiffs are filing complaints with courts and OCR alleging 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and various state-law antidiscrimination statutes.226 
While many of the administrative actions are still pending and under review, as 
223  Notably, the school assignment policy changes that favor a return to neighborhood schools 
have not been subject to legal challenge. This is likely the case because courts have consistently 
ruled that issues of school assignment, particularly the drawing of attendance zones, are within 
the discretion of local officials and will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence of 
intentional discrimination or other misconduct. See, e.g., Annotation, Discretion of 
Administrative Officers as to Changing Boundaries of School District, 135 A.L.R. 1096 (1941). 
224  See infra Part IV.A. 
225  See infra Part IV.A. 
226  John Hurdle, Education Dept. to Hear School Closing Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/education/education-department-to-hear-school-clos 
ing-complaints.html?_r=0 (“The United States Department of Education is investigating 
complaints that plans to close or reorganize public schools in Philadelphia, Detroit and Newark 
discriminate against black and Hispanic students, as well as those with disabilities, a department 
official confirmed on Monday.”); Valerie Strauss, Education Department Investigating Three 
School Civil Rights Complaints, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/10/15/education-department-investigating-three-school-civil-rights-
complaints/ (“The Education Department’s Office of Civil Rights is investigating three 
complaints filed on behalf of African American parents in New Orleans, Chicago and Newark 
alleging racial discrimination in the closing of scores of neighborhood public schools in those 
three cities.”). 
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discussed further in Part IV.B below, this Article takes the position that the 
administrative complaints are unlikely to prove fruitful in halting the use of 
exclusionary market-based reforms. Moreover, to date, courts are not finding 
that market-based reforms constitute intentional discrimination in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, or various state anti-discrimination laws. 
For example, in Philadelphia, parents and students filed a lawsuit 
against the Philadelphia School System challenging the impact of public school 
closures and charter school expansion on poor, minority, and disabled students 
in North Philadelphia.227 They alleged that the defendants were “closing 
neighborhood traditional public schools . . . [and] forcing plaintiffs to either 
[gain] admission into a local charter school or travel to another traditional 
public school through high crime areas where there was gang recruitment.”228 
The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated their equal protection and 
substantive due process rights.229 The plaintiffs ultimately voluntarily dismissed 
the case after reaching a settlement with the school district.230 Importantly, 
however, the court noted that even if the plaintiffs had not dismissed the case 
voluntarily, their claims were unlikely to succeed because the “issues [they] 
raised [were] political question[s]”231 better suited for the legislature than the 
court. 
In Chicago, parents of Black students also brought a lawsuit in federal 
court challenging the disparate impact that public school closings were having 
on African-American students.232 In particular, they challenged the closing of 
49 elementary schools in predominately Black neighborhoods and sought a 
preliminary injunction to stop the closings.233 The cornerstone of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint was that as a result of the school closings, “African-American 
students [were] suffer[ing] a disproportionate degree of academic harm . . . as 
compared to their non-African-American peers.”234 In response, the school 
district denied that the closings were racially discriminatory and instead cited 
underutilization of schools in predominately Black neighborhoods and the need 
to save money as the reason for closing the schools.235 
227  See Complaint, V.L. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 2:12-cv-03182 (E.D. Pa. filed June 5, 
2012), ECF No. 1. 
228  Id. at 15. 
229  Id. 
230  See Transcript of Settlement Conference at 5, V.L. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 2:12-cv-
03182 (E.D. Pa. filed July 17, 2012), ECF No. 11. 
231  Id. at 11–12. 
232  Swan v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., Nos. 13 C 3623, 13 C 3624, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 15, 2013). 
233  Id. at *1. 
234  Id. at *21. 
235  Id. at *3. 
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The plaintiffs countered by focusing specifically on the utilization 
criteria used by the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”) to determine which 
schools to close.236 They alleged that the utilization criteria resulted in African-
American students disproportionately bearing the brunt of school closures.237 
They pointed to statistics showing that “African–American students make up 
87% of the students in the closing schools, but only 40.5% of the students in 
CPS as a whole.”238 They alleged such a disparity amounted to a violation of 
the Illinois Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) which, amongst other things, prohibits 
discriminatory administration of any state program and allows proof of 
discriminatory administration to be shown through evidence of disparate 
impact.239 
Despite the stark racial differences between the overall racial 
composition of the Chicago public schools and the schools slated for closure, 
the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the closures violated the ICRA.240 
The court noted that in order to prevail on their ICRA claim, the plaintiffs had 
to “isolate and identify specific practices that are allegedly responsible for any 
observed statistical disparities” and show that they were “subject[] to an 
adverse action.”241 With respect to the policy or practice prong, the court found 
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that it was the 
utilization criteria used by the Chicago schools that resulted in the disparate 
impact upon African-American students.242 In reaching that conclusion, the 
court reasoned that additional criteria other than the utilization criteria—such as 
the ability to maintain a high quality facility at a low cost—went into the 
decision to close the 49 elementary schools.243 As a result, the court found that 
the plaintiffs failed to present statistical evidence of a “degree and kind” that 
could demonstrate that CPS violated the ICRA through its use of the utilization 
criteria.244 
More significantly, the court also held that the plaintiffs failed to show 
that the closures resulted in any actionable harm against African-American 
students.245 In so finding, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ evidence 
showed that the schools the students would be transferred to as a result of the 
closures were similar to but not worse than the schools they were leaving (and 
236  Id. at *19–20. 
237  Id. 
238  Id. at *19. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. at *20. 
241  Id. at *12, *21. 
242  Id. at *19–20. 
243  Id. at *20. 
244  Id. 
245  Id. at *21. 
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in the case of 12% of the students who would be transferred the schools would 
be better).246 Notably, in reaching its conclusion the court went to great lengths 
to note that the loss of a neighborhood school was not the type of harm that a 
court should give much weight to in determining whether an actionable harm 
was committed.247 Finally, the court also determined that the Chicago public 
school system offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the school 
closures, namely that the closing of so-called underutilized schools would save 
money which could then be reallocated to schools throughout the district.248 
Similarly, plaintiffs in Washington, D.C., challenging the exclusionary 
impact of market-based reforms were also unsuccessful. In Smith v. Henderson, 
advocates for poor minority children sought a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the Washington, D.C. public school system from going forward 
with a plan to close 15 public schools with low enrollment.249 They alleged that 
the school closures, along with an expansion of charter schools in D.C., were 
racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the D.C. Human Rights 
Act.250 The plaintiffs presented evidence that 93% of the students displaced as a 
result of the closures were Black, 6.6% Latino, while less than 0.1%—or fewer 
than six students—were white.251 This contrasted with the overall 
demographics of the District in which 69% of students were Black, 16% 
Latino, 11% white, and 4% Asian, other, or unknown.252 The plaintiffs claimed 
that this disparity demonstrated that the District was engaging in 
unconstitutional racial discrimination.253 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, emphasizing that many of 
plaintiffs’ “contentions are political rather than legal.”254 The court emphasized 
the heavy burden that the plaintiffs bore in trying to establish the kind of 
intentional discrimination needed to prevail on a Title VI or equal protection 
claim.255 The court emphasized that they would need to show that the schools 
were closed “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’” the impact 
246  Id. at *22 (citing testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert witness stating that approximately 
12.5% of students from closing schools were sent to better performing schools, where one would 
expect the students to improve academically, but that 87% of students would be transferred to 
schools where one would not expect improved academic performance). 
247  Id. at *23–24. 
248  Id. 
249  54 F. Supp. 3d 58, 60–61, 69 (D.D.C. 2014). 
250  Id. at 64–65. 
251  Id. at 64. 
252  Id. 
253  Id. 
254  Id. at 67. 
255  Id. at 68–69. 
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on the closure’s minority students.256 Although the court conceded that 
statistics cited by the plaintiffs were stark, the court determined that the district 
provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the disparities through its 
allegation that closing the under-enrolled schools would save resources that 
could be spread throughout the district to the benefit of all students.257 
Challenges to charter schools expansion in Washington, D.C., have 
also met a similar unsuccessful fate. In Save Our Schools-Southeast and 
Northeast v. District of Columbia Board of Education, plaintiffs alleged that 
the D.C. public school system created a dual and unequal system of education 
in which charter schools were given more funding and resources than 
traditional public schools.258 As a result, the plaintiffs alleged students in 
charter schools received better educational opportunities.259 The plaintiffs 
further alleged that the dichotomy in resources given to charter schools versus 
public schools was racially discriminatory because the traditional public 
schools were predominately Black and poor while the charter schools were 
primarily white and affluent families.260 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.261 The court 
instead found that the plaintiffs failed to allege or demonstrate any 
discriminatory intent underlying the different funding and resources given to 
charter schools versus traditional public schools.262 The court further noted that 
the plaintiffs conceded that mismanagement and incompetent leadership 
explained, at least in part, some of the reasons why the predominately Black 
traditional public schools offered fewer educational opportunities.263 Because 
the plaintiffs conceded that reasons other than a discriminatory motive by the 
school system caused the injury of which plaintiffs complained (i.e. fewer 
educational opportunities), the court found that the plaintiffs failed to state an 
equal protection claim.264 Courts in other jurisdictions considering race-based 
challenges to charter school expansion have come to similar conclusions.265 
256  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 257–58 
(1979)). 
257  Id. at 64. 
258  See Save Our Schs.-Se. & Ne. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-01500(HHK), 2006 WL 
1827654, at *1 (D.D.C. July 3, 2006). 
259  See id. 
260  See id. at *11–12. 
261  Id. at *13. 
262  Id. 
263  Id. 
264  Id. 
265  Indeed, in the face of race-based equal protection challenges to charter school expansion 
in both gentrifying and non-gentrifying areas, most courts have found that plaintiffs challenging 
the expansion of charter schools cannot demonstrate racial discrimination because they fail to 
show the requisite discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 485–87 
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As demonstrated above, court challenges to both public school closures 
and charter school expansion have been unsuccessful. This is the case primarily 
because of the inability of plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent. In the public 
school closure cases in particular, the only tangible evidence plaintiffs can 
typically present that the facially neutral public school policies are 
discriminatory is the disparate impact that the school closures would have on 
poor Black and Latino communities. Yet, as other legal scholars have noted, 
the discriminatory intent requirement places a nearly insurmountable obstacle 
on plaintiffs.266 Government actions usually involve a multitude of motives and 
an improper motive can easily be subsumed within a proper motive.267 Indeed, 
the courts’ decisions in Swann and Smith focused heavily on the non-
discriminatory reason proffered by the school systems for closing the schools—
specifically the alleged underutilization of those schools and the cost savings 
that would accrue by closing the schools.268 
Importantly, however, in heavily deferring to the school system’s 
underutilization rationale, the courts completely ignored the history of 
discrimination that gave rise to the conditions which caused public schools in 
predominately Black neighborhoods to be underutilized in the first place. In 
particular, both the Swann and Smith decisions fail to account for or assign 
responsibility to the school systems for the history of racial segregation and 
inadequate funding once white flight occurred in these school systems.269 The 
courts likely ignored this history because of the narrow scope of the 
discriminatory intent requirement of the disparate impact analysis. In this 
analysis, only the motive of the actor is considered without any historical 
context.
270
 As a result, the plaintiffs in Swann and Smith were unable to 
(10th Cir. 1996) (Latino parents challenging the closing of traditional public elementary schools 
and opening of charter schools in their place as racially discriminatory in violation of their 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, but the court finding that the school system did 
not have discriminatory intent in closing the elementary schools and opening the charter schools), 
abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
266  Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of 
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 40–41 (1977) (critiquing the discriminatory 
purpose requirement imposed in disparate impact cases). 
267  See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987) (noting that “a motive-centered doctrine 
of racial discrimination places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the 
wrong side of the dispute. Improper motives are easy to hide.”). 
268  See, e.g., Smith v. Henderson, 54 F. Supp. 3d 58, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that the 
racial disparities related to the school closings were related to the location of the schools, not 
intentional discrimination), appeal dismissed, No. 14-7120 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015); Swann v. 
Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623, 13 C 3624, 2013 WL 4401439, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) 
(finding that the school board’s stated assertion of wanting to save money by closing 
underutilized schools was a valid and non-discriminatory reason for the closures). 
269  See generally sources cited supra note 268. 
270  See Eisenberg, supra note 266, at 114–15. 
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demonstrate that the schools were slated for closure because of, and not in spite 
of, the impact closure would have on minority students. This will prove 
problematic for any litigant attempting to show that public school closings and 
charter school expansion are intentionally discriminatory. 
B. Administrative Challenges to Market-Based Public School Reforms 
Advocates attempting to stop school closures and charter school 
expansion that disparately impact poor and minority students are also filing 
administrative complaints with OCR.271 They are alleging that the school 
closings and charter school expansion violate Title VI.272 To date, such 
complaints have been filed in gentrifying urban cities such as Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania; Newark, New Jersey; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Chicago, 
Illinois.273 Advocates are using this approach because agencies charged with 
enforcing Title VI are able to rely upon regulations that state that if a program 
or policy has a disparate impact on protected classes, it is a violation of Title 
VI.274 The ability to use the disparate impact regulations in the context of 
challenging public school closings is limited to OCR because the Supreme 
Court held that the disparate impact regulations cannot be enforced through a 
private right of action.275 Thus, only OCR, and not private individuals, can use 
a disparate impact theory to challenge public school closings and charter school 
expansion. 
Given the disparate impact shown in cases such as Smith and Swann in 
Washington, D.C., and Chicago respectively, filing administrative complaints 
with OCR under a disparate impact theory of discrimination is the most 
promising legal avenue in which to challenge public school closures and 
charter school expansion. Yet, that strategy will also be challenging for at least 
three reasons. 
First, upon receiving a complaint, OCR first investigates the complaint 
to determine whether it has any merit.276 In conducting the investigation, OCR 
uses a variety of fact-finding techniques in order to determine whether the 
allegations in the complaint have merit.277 A number of advocates suggest that 
271  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 226. 
272  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 226. 
273  See Layton, supra note 168; JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra 203, at 1. 
274  See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2015). 
275  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001) (“This Court has not, however, held 
that Title VI disparate-impact regulations may be enforced through a private right of action.”). 
276  See Office of Civil Rights, OCR Complaint Processing Procedures, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. 
(Feb. 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaints-how.html. 
277  Id. (“OCR may use a variety of fact-finding techniques in its investigation of a complaint. 
These techniques may include reviewing documentary evidence submitted by both parties, 
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OCR during the fact-finding investigative stage “does not appear to regularly 
apply the adverse impact doctrine in complaint investigations and 
determinations,” but instead applies the more stringent intentional 
discrimination standard.278 In the context of school closures and charter school 
expansions, the use of disparate impact analysis is likely critical to finding a 
violation of Title VI. As demonstrated in the Swann and Smith cases, under a 
strict intentional discrimination theory, it is unlikely that the school closings 
and charter school expansions will be deemed discriminatory.279 If the 
intentional discrimination theory is indeed used when investigating the school 
closures and charter school expansions, it is highly unlikely that OCR will find 
a violation of Title VI. 
Second, as other scholars have also noted, the vigor of any OCR 
investigation is very much dependent upon a number of factors including 
political priorities.280 As discussed in Part II.B, the executive branch’s embrace 
of charter school expansion, at a minimum, calls into question the likelihood of 
OCR finding that the school closings and charter school expansions are 
discriminatory. 
Third, even if OCR were to find a violation and find it necessary to sue 
in federal court in order to ensure compliance, despite the existence of the 
disparate impact regulations, OCR would still have a difficult time meeting its 
legal burden of showing that the school closings and charter school expansions 
violate Title VI. In assessing whether a policy or practice violates Title VI 
under a disparate impact theory, courts follow the same burden-shifting 
framework used in Title VII disparate impact cases.281 Thus, a plaintiff must 
first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. He or she must demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that a recipient of federal funds adopted a 
conducting interviews with the complainant, recipient’s personnel, and other witnesses, and/or 
site visits.”). 
278  David Simson, Exclusion, Punishment, Racism and Our Schools: A Critical Race Theory 
Perspective on School Discipline, 61 UCLA L. REV. 506, 513 (2014); see also Adira Siman, 
Challenging Zero Tolerance: Federal and State Legal Remedies for Students of Color, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 438 (2005). 
279  See generally Smith v. Henderson, 54 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D.D.C. 2014), appeal dismissed, 
No. 14-7120 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015); Swann v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623, 13 C 3624, 2013 
WL 44014395 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013). 
280  See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering That Has No Name: Title VI and the 
Meaning of Private Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1311–12, 1328 (2014) (“The 
disadvantages of the administrative process are well understood, including potential problems of 
bureaucratic torpor, politics, and even capture.”). 
281  See Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 
1985) (noting that “[t]he elements of a disparate impact claim may be gleaned by reference to 
cases decided under Title VII”), abrogated by Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989); 
see also N.Y. Urb. League v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Courts considering 
claims under analogous Title VI regulations have looked to Title VII disparate impact cases for 
guidance.”). 
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facially race neutral policy that has a disproportionate impact on a protected 
category of individuals.282 Importantly, a finding that the disparate impact 
would have existed in the absence of the policy or action taken by a federal 
fund recipient will impede a plaintiff’s ability to meet this showing.283 For 
example, if a defendant school system were able to show that the schools would 
have been closed because all neighborhood children chose to go elsewhere, 
OCR would likely be unable to make its prima facie case. 
Assuming OCR is able to make a prima facie case, the burden would 
then shift to the defendant school systems to show that they have a “substantial 
and legitimate justification” for closings schools and expanding charter 
schools.284 In the context of education cases, courts interpret this to mean that 
the defendant school system must show that “their challenged practices ‘bear a 
manifest demonstrable relationship to classroom education.’”285 Courts set a 
low bar for what this means in practical terms. Courts have found that the 
defendant school system only needs to show that the challenged practice is 
necessary to meet an important educational goal.286 In the Swann and Smith 
cases, the plaintiffs argued that the school closures met the important goal of 
saving money that could be better used to help students district wide by 
eliminating underutilized schools.287 Such a justification is likely to be used by 
other school systems. Given the low bar set by courts, this would in all 
likelihood be considered a substantial and legitimate justification.288 
Lastly, if a school system did indeed show a substantial and legitimate 
justification for closing schools, OCR could then only prevail by showing that 
there are effective alternative practices that would have less of a racially 
disparate impact or that the school closings were a pretext for discrimination.
289
 
282  See Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417. 
283  Elston v. Talledega Cty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[P]laintiff 
cannot make out a prima facie disparate impact claim if the evidence tends to show that even had 
the defendant not engaged in the challenged practice, the same disparate impact would 
nonetheless have existed.”); United States v. Lowndes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 878 F.2d 1301, 1305 
(11th Cir. 1989) (“Racial imbalance in the public schools amounts to a constitutional violation 
only if it results from some form of state action and not from factors, such as residential housing 
patterns, which are beyond the control of state officials.”). 
284  See Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417–18. 
285  Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412 (quoting Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1418). 
286  See id. at 1412–13; Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417–20; Sharif v. 
N.Y. Dep’t of St. Educ., 709 F. Supp. 345, 361–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
287  Smith v. Henderson, 54 F. Supp. 3d 58, 71 (D.D.C. 2014), appeal dismissed, No. 14-7120 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015); Swann v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623, 13 C 3624, 2013 WL 
4401439, at *24–25 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013). 
288  See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 150, at 316 (suggesting that financial and enrollment 
challenges facing school districts would likely meet the substantial justification test for closing 
under public schools and expanding charter schools). 
289  Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407. 
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It would likely be difficult for OCR to convince a court that there are effective 
alternative practices, as courts often loathe to wade into what they consider 
questions of appropriate education policy.290 Similarly, showing that the 
closings were a pretext for discrimination would also be difficult as it would 
require OCR to prove subjective intent on the part of the school system, which 
as other scholars have noted, is extremely difficult.291 For these reasons, 
administrative challenges through OCR are unlikely to halt the public school 
closings and charter school expansion. 
In sum, challenges to market-based reforms through the courts and 
OCR have not proved successful. Poor and minority students continue to be 
harmed by market-based reforms but are left without a viable remedy due to the 
ineffectiveness of the litigation-based challenges. As discussed in the following 
Part, enacting state legislation that seeks to capitalize on the shared interests of 
gentrifiers and poor and minority students is one potential solution that may 
prove effective. 
V. GENTRIFICATION, URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORMS, AND THE 
POSSIBILITIES FOR INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
The renewed interest of white middle class gentrifiers in urban public 
schools presents a rare situation in which the interests of gentrifiers and poor 
minority families actually coincide. Yet local officials are creating an 
unnecessary and harmful interest divergence between gentrifiers and poor and 
minority families in an attempt to cater to the interest of gentrifiers. Further, to 
date, the only recourse that advocates have utilized to remedy the problem 
(unsuccessfully) are legal claims with the courts and OCR. This Part situates 
the shared interests of poor minority families and gentrifiers in improving 
urban public schools within the context of Derek Bell’s Interest Convergence 
Theory. It concludes by offering suggestions on how to use the Interest 
Convergence Theory to formulate effective legislative-based urban school 
reforms that benefit all children in urban schools. 
290  See, e.g., Smith, 54 F. Supp. at 7 (“For any policymaker, whether to embrace these 
[school] reforms is a difficult question that requires expert judgment. For courts, it is simply an 
impossible—indeed, an impermissible—question to answer.”). 
291  See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination By Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 
(2011) (noting the challenges in proving discriminatory intent). 
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A. The Interest Convergence Theory 
The Interest Convergence Theory was created by Professor Derek Bell 
in order to explain the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.292 The theory posits that  
the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites. The fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not 
authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality 
for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior 
societal status of middle and upper class whites.293  
The theory further suggests that protection of minorities in racial cases 
“may not actually be determined by the character of the harm suffered by 
blacks or quantum of liability against whites . . . instead [it will be determined 
by] the subconscious judicial conclusion that the remedies, if granted, will . . . 
advance or at least not harm societal interest deemed important . . . [to] 
whites.”294 Professor Bell used this theory to explain how the Supreme Court’s 
decision to end racial segregation in schools coincided with elite whites’ 
interests in winning the Cold War.295 More specifically, he suggested that elite 
whites had an interest in ending racial segregation in public schools to assure 
Black Americans that they were a welcome part of the American democracy 
and to lend credibility to America’s fight against Communism.296 
The Interest Convergence Theory examines the progress that Blacks 
(and other minorities) have made in America from a historical perspective, 
looking not at “what will be” but “what has been.”297 It describes societal or 
macro changes—it does not describe the subjective motivations or 
psychological attitudes of all individuals.298 Thus, the Interest Convergence 
Theory suggests that historically racial progress tends to occur when there is a 
convergence between minority and white interests, regardless of the 
psychological motivations of individuals.299 Significantly, the Interest 
Convergence Theory does not suggest that the aggregate of minority interests 
292  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence-
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
293  Id. at 523 (emphasis added). 
294  Id. 
295  Id. at 524. 
296  Id. at 524–25. 
297  See Stephan F. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding the Interest Convergence 
Thesis, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 248, 249 (2012). 
298  Id. at 254. 
299  Id. 
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and white interests always coincide.300 It does suggest, however, that on a 
macro level, in some instances some minorities and some whites will have 
shared interests and that when those shared interests coincide, racial progress 
will occur. 
The Interest Convergence Theory, while initially dismissed as 
substantially inaccurate, has come to gain acceptance amongst a broad swath of 
advocates and scholars.301 The theory is often utilized to explain court cases 
and trends.302 It is also used as an affirmative tool or strategy to get legislative 
reform enacted.303 The section that follows examines how the Interest 
Convergence Theory might be used to enact legislation that satisfies the 
interests of both poor and minority families and gentrifiers. 
B. Creating Interest Convergence Between Poor and Minority Families 
and Gentrifiers 
Using the Interest Convergence Theory as a guide, if the ultimate goal 
for local governments is to better urban public schools through gentrification 
without disproportionately affecting poor minority students, progress will occur 
if we cause the interests of the poor minority students and gentrifying students 
to converge. Poor and minority parents and students have long had an interest 
in improving urban public schools, particularly after years of decline and decay 
brought on by middle-class white flight. As a result of the resurgence of urban 
gentrification and an influx of middle- and upper-middle class white 
professionals, white middle- and upper-middle class residents also, at least in 
the abstract, share an interest in improving urban public schools with poor and 
minority families. 
In reality, however, this shared interest is complicated by the nuances 
of race and class. While middle-class white gentrifiers are interested in seeing 
improvements to urban school systems, their interest is understandably limited 
to reforms that positively impact the options available to them, rather than the 
system as a whole. Paradoxically, even though many gentrifiers express a 
desire for schools with racial diversity, when choosing schools they also tend to 
300  Id. 
301  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes—
Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 369, 373 (2002) 
(“[Professor Bell’s] hypothesis was greeted with cries of outrage. Deemed a cynical explanation 
of whites’ benevolent conduct, it was dismissed as the jaded speculation of a civil rights warrior 
who had given up on the promise of America.”). 
302  See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural 
Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 925–30 (2007) (demonstrating the ways in which the Interest 
Convergence Theory has been used by legal scholars to explain key U.S. Supreme Court and 
lower federal court cases). 
303  Id. at 933–39 (explaining how the Interest Convergence Theory has been used to advocate 
for legislative reform in the areas of education, workplace, political, and other reform). 
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prefer schools with a smaller minority student population because of the 
negative perceptions attached to schools with high concentrations of minority 
students.304 As a result, gentrifiers often do not object to, but instead demand, 
market-based reforms that increase the urban public school options available to 
them while simultaneously increasing race and class segregation in urban 
schools.305 Thus, an interest displacement rather than an interest convergence is 
created between gentrifier families and poor and minority families. 
The challenge therefore is to understand the ways in which interest 
convergence rather than interest displacement can be created between poor and 
minority families and middle-class gentrifier families. The key question in this 
analysis involves finding ways to get white gentrifiers to care about and 
become invested in the schooling options available to poor minority families. In 
other words, one must expand the abstract interest (that poor minority families 
and gentrifiers share in improving urban school systems) to a more concrete 
one that allows gentrifiers to disfavor school reform methods that improve only 
a subset of the urban public school system in ways that only benefit them. 
One way to create interest convergence is to expand white gentrifiers’ 
understanding of what is in both their short-term and long-term self-interest. To 
be sure, self-interest is a key component in creating interest convergence.306 
The Interest Convergence Theory suggests that it is only when the self-interest 
of elite whites is in line with racial justice for minorities will such justice 
actually occur.307 In the case of urban public school reforms, important self-
interests that gentrifiers hold are being obfuscated by the marginal increase in 
the urban public school choices made available to them by market-based 
reforms. In particular, the number of quality charter schools or traditional 
public schools in many urban school systems is in short-supply. At some point, 
as gentrification expands, there will no longer be enough seats in the best 
charter schools or best traditional public schools for all gentrifier children. 
Indeed, this is already the case in cities like Philadelphia and Washington, 
D.C., where the demand for quality public schools by gentrifiers is greatly 
304  See Posey, supra note 5, at 17–18 (noting that for gentrifier parents, “race, class, and 
school quality [are] conflated in [their] minds” and finding that gentrifier parents were reluctant 
to send their children to a school with a high concentration of African-American students because 
such a school is associated with poverty and less rigorous academic programs). 
305  See, e.g., STILLMAN, supra note 9, at 100–01. 
306  See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology 
Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 288 (2005) (suggesting that “a more 
enlightened understanding of self-interest can form the basis for political coalitions that [are able 
to] transcend race, class, and ideology”). 
307  See DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
7 (1992) (“[Only] [w]hen whites perceive that it will be profitable or at least cost-free to serve, 
hire, admit, or otherwise deal with blacks on a nondiscriminatory basis, they do so. When they 
fear—accurately or not—that there may be a loss, inconvenience, or upset to themselves or other 
whites, discriminatory conduct usually follows.”). 
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outstripping the supply.308 For that reason, it is in the long-term best interest of 
gentrifiers to become invested in reforms that improve the entire urban public 
school system rather than a small cross-section of the system. 
Further, as previously noted, gentrifiers expect the amenities in urban 
cities to match their higher class status.309 Research suggests that for the 
gentrifier demographic, white middle- and upper-class residents, construction 
of what constitutes a quality public school is heavily depended upon the overall 
perception of the school system in which the individual school is situated.310 A 
school is more likely to be perceived as a high quality school by white middle- 
and upper-class residents if it is part of a school system that has strong 
reputation.311 To the extent that gentrifiers do indeed want the schools that they 
select for their children to be perceived as high quality, enacting reforms that 
improve urban public systems from top to bottom rather than a few choice 
schools would go a long way towards that interest. 
Finally, gentrifiers have a long-term specific economic self-interest in 
ensuring that urban school reforms increase educational opportunities for all 
students, not just their own. An educated workforce is a necessary pre-requisite 
for economic growth, particularly in the new knowledge-based economy.312 
Continued growth of urban areas is predicated upon having a well-educated 
urban populace. Yet scholars have noted that because “of the growing number 
of minority students in public schools, if existing educational trends continue, 
the nation risks something it has never before seen: an intergenerational decline 
308  See, e.g., Patrick Kerkstra, Urban Education’s Breadline Problem, NEXT CITY (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/urban-educations-breadline-problem (noting that demand 
for seats in Philadelphia’s Penn Alexander elementary school led to parents waiting in line for 
four days prior to the date that registration applications for the school were due and that as a 
result, the city changed the admission process for the school from first-come, first-serve to an 
admissions lottery). 
309  See McFarlane, supra note 17, at 23. 
310  STILLMAN, supra note 9, at 29 (describing the school selection process for gentrifiers in 
New York and finding that gentrifier “‘high-status’ parents, through conversation, reinforced 
each other’s beliefs about what was, and was not, an acceptable schooling option, primarily 
based upon whether other ‘high-status’ children attended a school”); Jellison Holme supra note 
18, at 192 (“[P]arents in the study drew conclusions about the quality of schools based on where 
other high-status parents sent their children.”). 
311  Jellison Holme, supra note 18, at 202 (“[P]arents’ school choice decisions are, therefore, 
not the individualized endeavor that choice proponents portray them to be, nor are they simply 
about obtaining a good education. Rather, such choices are fundamentally a struggle for status 
and distinction, a means by which privileged parents seek out high-status institutions that will 
confer both material and social advantages on their children.”). 
312  Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith & Jeff Strohl, Help Wanted: Projections of Jobs and 
Education Requirements Through 2018, GEO. UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE 19–28 
(June 2010), https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/fullreport.pdf 
(documenting the ways in which higher levels of education will shape the job opportunities 
available to workers). 
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in its educational level, a threatening outcome in a knowledge-based, global 
economy.”313 To the extent that gentrifiers are part of the knowledge-based 
group of workers that benefit from a revitalized and economically strong urban 
core, they should support urban school reforms that benefit and provide more 
opportunity for a larger cross-section of the urban city. 
C. Using Legislative Solutions to Capitalize on Interest Convergence 
Focusing on the aforementioned ways in which the self-interest of 
gentrifiers can be used to create true interest convergence with poor and 
minority families offers a rare opportunity to improve urban public schools: 
improvements that will actually have substantive benefits for poor and minority 
students. The following is a non-exhaustive list of potential legislative solutions 
that, if implemented, could meet the interests of both poor and minority 
families and gentrifier families. 
First, as other scholars have noted, most low-performing schools in 
urban areas are low-performing because, among other things, students and their 
families are dealing with a plethora of non-school issues that make learning 
difficult.314 Instead of closing low-performing schools and replacing them with 
charter schools, a better alternative might be to replace low-performing schools 
with Community Based Schools (“CBS”). CBSs are schools that partner with 
other public service providers to provide not just educational services, but also 
much needed support to distressed communities in areas such as health care, 
counseling, adult education, and cultural events.315 
For example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, the Cincinnati School District 
revamped its failing schools with CBSs called community learning centers.316 
The community learning centers in Cincinnati have shown modest but 
important progress. Improved graduation rates, test scores, attendance, and 
community revitalization have been a hallmark of the community learning 
313  See Brief for 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curie Supporting Respondents at 12, Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2006) (Nos. 05-908 and 05-
915), 2006 WL 2927079, at *12. 
314  See, e.g., Black, supra note 127, at 404–06. 
315  See, e.g., What Is a Community School?, COALITION FOR COMMUNITY SCHS. 
http://www.communityschools.org/aboutschools/what_is_a_community_school.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2015) (describing community schools as a “place and set of partnerships between the 
school and other community resources” and noting that community schools “bring together a 
range of supports and opportunities to children, youth, families, and communities”). 
316  CINCINNATI CITY SCH. DIST., BYLAWS & POLICIES § 7500, http://community.cps-k12.org/ 
sites/boardpolicies/7000%20Property/7500%20Policy%20Community%20Learning%20Centers.
pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (“[E]ach school should also be a community learning center in 
which a variety of partners shall offer academic programs, enrichment activities, and support to 
students, families, and community members before and after school as well as during the 
evenings and on weekends throughout the calendar year.”). 
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center expansion in Cincinnati.317 Some form of CBSs have been successfully 
implemented in other high poverty urban school systems and achieved similar 
successes.318 
Given the self-interest that gentrifiers should have in improving all 
aspects of urban school systems, enacting CBSs could achieve that goal while 
simultaneously providing meaningful learning opportunities for poor minority 
children and revitalizing predominately poor and minority communities. In 
order to ensure their substantive quality, CBSs could be subject to monitoring 
requirements similar to the monitoring requirements in the school 
desegregation context in the South. In those southern school districts, prior to 
achieving unitary status, each district had to file reports documenting the 
quality of the curricular offerings to Black students, discipline measures, access 
to extracurricular activities, the quality of the teaching staff, etc.319 
One obvious question with respect to CBSs is the question of scale. In 
particular, whether a system of CBSs could be implemented on a district-wide 
basis given the high number of failing schools in many urban districts and the 
intensive financial and manpower cost associated with putting CBSs in place.320 
One answer to this dilemma might be to implement CBS on an individual 
school-wide basis rather than systematically in areas with no or limited public 
schools available.321 Such an approach, though not ideal, would at least be a 
317  See Javier C. Hernández, Mayoral Candidates See Cincinnati as a Model for New York 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/nyregion/candidates-
see-cincinnati-as-model-for-new-york-schools.html?_r=0 (“[A]fter years of poor performance 
and an exodus of middle-class families to the suburbs, Cincinnati has made some of the greatest 
gains in test scores in Ohio in recent years, even though it lags behind state averages. School 
officials here credit the city’s embrace of the community schools model, which is now fully in 
place in 34 of 55 schools in the system.”). 
318  Community School—Results that Turn Around Failing Schools: Test Scores, Attendance, 
Graduation and College-Going Rates, COALITION FOR COMMUNITY SCHS. 2 (May 2010), 
http://www.communityschools.org/assets/1/AssetManager/Turning_Around_Schools_CS_Result
s2.pdf (describing successful implementation of community schools in New York, New York; 
Providence, Rhode Island; and Tukwila, Washington.). 
319  See, e.g., Youngblood v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 770, 771 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(requiring the school district to submit semi-annual reports); United States v. Hinds Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 433 F.2d 611, 612 n.1, 618–19 (5th Cir. 1970) (same). 
320  See generally Martin J. Blank, Reuben Jacobson, Atelia Melaville & Sarah S. Pearson, 
Financing Community Schools: Leveraging Resources to Support Student Success, COALITION
FOR COMMUNITY SCHS. (Nov. 2010), http://www.communityschools.org/assets/1/AssetManager/ 
finance-paper.pdf. 
321  In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, policymakers implemented one CBC concept school at 
Sayre High School through a partnership with the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia 
School-Based Family Service Centers, CITY COUNCIL OF PHILA. 12 (2015), http://issuu.com/ 
phlcouncil/docs/brochure_-_school-based_family_serv. The school was modeled off of 
Cincinnati’s Community Learning Center model and resulted in a 90% graduation rate with 56% 
of the students going on to college. Id. at 8. 
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start to creating more educational opportunities for poor minority students 
while at the same time improving the overall quality of the school system. 
Second, in the event that a school closure is indeed necessary as a 
result of low-enrollment or underutilization, state legislation should be enacted 
to ensure that the closing of a public school does not destabilize a 
neighborhood. Such legislation could include a rule regarding replacement of 
closed public schools that is similar to the one-for-one replacement rule used to 
ensure that affordable housing remains when public housing units are 
demolished.322 While the one-for-one replacement rule was eventually repealed 
by Congress (and arguably contributed to the displacement of poor and 
minorities from gentrifying areas), the new Choice Neighborhoods Initiative 
has a replacement rule worth modeling.323 The new Choice Neighborhoods 
Initiative Rule requires that “grantees build at least one subsidized replacement 
housing unit for every unit demolished in the target development, except when 
objective measures indicate that the local housing market is too weak to 
warrant full replacement.”324 
Similarly, state legislation targeting school closures could require that 
every neighborhood have at least one public school within a specific proximity 
(for example, two miles), except when objective measures indicate that there 
would be issues obtaining adequate enrollment in a replacement school. Having 
neighborhood schools in predominantly Black and Latino neighborhoods 
benefits cities as a whole to the extent that schools serve a stabilizing function 
in neighborhoods.325 Requiring that schools be replaced where feasible is a 
better solution than the market-based reforms because such measures aim to 
ensure that there are neighborhood schools in Black and Latino neighborhoods. 
Third, and finally, while the proliferation of charter schools is often 
viewed as a positive in terms of providing parents with more choices, the 
reality is often that very few charter schools provide high quality education.326 
Both poor and minority families and more affluent gentrifier families are left 
fighting for the limited number of slots in the better charter schools.327 Thus, 
both groups should have a similar interest in lobbying for legislation that limits 
incentives for further expansion of charter schools and instead calls for 
322  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3535(d), 4601, 5304, 12705(b) (2013); 24 C.F.R. § 42.375 (2015). 
323  See ROLF PENDALL & LEAH HENDEY, A BRIEF LOOK AT THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF
CHOICE NEIGHBORHOODS 2 (2013), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/brief-look-early-
implementation-choice-neighborhoods (“Choice maintains HOPE VI’s emphasis on public-
private partnerships and mixed-financing for replacing or rehabilitating assisted housing. Choice 
also extends eligibility beyond public housing to privately-owned, federally subsidized 
developments.”). 
324  Id. 
325  See JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra 203, at 25. 
326  See discussion supra Part III.D and text accompanying note 214. 
327  See discussion supra Part III.D and text accompanying note 214. 
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increased investment in public schools. For example, some advocates suggest 
applying pressure at the federal level to exclude charter schools from receiving 
the New Market Tax Credit,328 a credit often given to charter schools located in 
urban areas as part of a broader scheme to spur investment in low-income 
communities.329 This is one solution worth pursuing along with a simultaneous 
push for added incentives through Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act330 (“ESEA”) for urban school systems that maintain a balance of 
having at least 70% traditional public schools versus no more than 30% charter 
schools. The push should be for amendments to the ESEA that provide 
additional funding for school districts in which at least 70% of the schools 
within the system are traditional public schools. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examines the implications of gentrification on urban 
public schools. In particular, it argues that certain market-based reforms are 
being implemented en masse, at least in part, in order to make urban public 
schools more attractive options for gentrifiers. However, the current reliance 
upon market-based reforms to improve urban school systems creates an 
unnecessary rift between the interests of gentrifiers and the interests of poor 
and minority students. These market-based reforms are ultimately harming the 
poor, minority students in urban cities by creating school deserts and charter 
schools that favor the interests of gentrifiers. Both gentrifiers and poor and 
minority students have an interest in improving urban public schools. As a 
result, a unique opportunity exists to reform urban public school systems in 
ways that benefit all students. Legislative reform, rather than solely market-
based reform and reactionary litigation, should be used to reform urban schools 
in ways that benefit both poor and minority students and gentrifiers alike. 
328  See JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra 203, at 26. 
329  See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, New Markets Tax Credit Program, COMMUNITY DEV. FIN.
INSTITUTIONS FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Programs/new-markets-tax-cre 
dit/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
330  See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–578 (2013). 
